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The main purpose of this book is to examine the impact of the ‘postmodern  
turn’1 on the contemporary social sciences. More specifically, the study seeks to 
demonstrate that the development of the social sciences in the late twentieth   
and early twenty-first centuries has been substantially shaped by key assumptions 
underlying theoretical approaches that defend both the epistemic validity and the 
historical significance of the ‘postmodern turn’. Here, the ‘postmodern turn’ is 
conceived of as a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative 
determinacy of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly 
widespread – post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material 
and symbolic forms of existence. As shall be illustrated in the following chapters, 
the far-reaching importance of this paradigmatic transformation is reflected in 
five influential presuppositional ‘turns’, which have arguably been taking place 
in the social sciences over the past few decades and which are inextricably linked 
to the rise of postmodern thought: 
 
I. the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology; 
II. the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology; 
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology; 
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and 
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics. 
 
With the aim of shedding light on both the centrality and the complexity of these 
normative transitions, the analysis is structured as follows. 
The principal objective of the preliminary sections, succeeding the chapter 
outline, is to reflect on  three  cornerstones of the following study: (i) social theory, 
(ii) the modern, and (iii) the postmodern. (i) To what extent is social theory, by defini- 
tion, a ‘modern’ undertaking? And to what extent is it possible to conceive of social 
theory, in the contemporary era, as a ‘postmodern’ project? (ii) What does the 
concept of ‘the modern’ stand for? What are the key dimensions of ‘modernity’? 
And of what does ‘the ambivalence of modernity’ consist? (iii) What does the 
concept of ‘the postmodern’ refer to? Who are the scholars whose works are 
 
 
 commonly associated with this concept? How can we make sense of the intel- 
lectual scope and influence of postmodern thought? And, finally, what are the 
key dimensions of ‘postmodernity’? In addition to responding to the previous 
questions, these introductory sections will elucidate why, from a terminological 
point of view, it is useful to distinguish between the concepts of ‘modernity’, 
‘modernism’, and ‘modernization’, as well as – in parallel – between the concepts 
of ‘postmodernity’, ‘postmodernism’, and ‘postmodernization’. 
The first chapter explores the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary 
debates in epistemology. Questions concerning the nature of knowledge (‘What is 
knowledge?’), the possibility of knowledge (‘How is knowledge acquired?’), and 
the validity of knowledge (‘To what extent is a particular type of knowledge reli- 
able?’) have been pivotal to the development of the social sciences from the very 
beginning of their existence. Arguably, contemporary conceptions of knowledge 
have been profoundly influenced by what may be described as the relativist turn 
in epistemology. According to epistemological relativism, the nature, possibility, 
and validity of all knowledge are contingent upon the spatiotemporal specificity 
of the sociohistorical context in which it emerges. This view can be regarded as 
an attack on the Enlightenment trust in both the representational capacity and 
the explanatory power of scientific knowledge and, therefore, as an assault on 
one of the epistemic cornerstones of modern social theory. As shall be shown      
in this chapter, the presuppositional differences between modern and postmodern 
conceptions of knowledge become apparent in three epistemological tensions: (i) 
truth versus perspective, (ii) certainty versus uncertainty, and (iii) universality versus 
particularity. By means of a thorough enquiry into these antinomies, a distinc- 
tion can be drawn between positivist and postpositivist conceptions of knowledge. 
Offering an overview of the main presuppositions underlying these diametrically 
opposed accounts of knowledge acquisition, the chapter examines the core rea- 
sons for the gradual shift from positivist to postpositivist epistemological agendas in 
the contemporary social sciences. 
The second chapter looks into the impact of postmodern thought on central 
issues in social research methodology. Without intending to do justice to the intri- 
cacies attached to the elaboration of alternative – and, arguably, postmodern – 
research strategies in the social sciences, this chapter shall be limited to focusing 
on the principal dimensions of a methodological approach that has not only 
gained increasing influence on contemporary forms of sociological investigation 
but also shares a number of fundamental assumptions with postmodern thought: 
discourse analysis. To a noteworthy extent, contemporary approaches to human 
enquiry have incorporated insights obtained from what may be termed the inter- 
pretive turn  in social research methodology. Similar to postmodern approaches 
in the social sciences, discourse analysts emphasize the normative significance   
of the meaning-laden dimensions of everyday life. Although it would be simplis- 
tic to portray the discrepancies between modern and postmodern approaches to 
social research methods in terms of clear-cut conceptual separations, the follow- 
ing three tensions are worth reflecting upon in some detail: (i) explanation versus
 understanding, (ii) mechanics versus dialectics, and (iii) ideology versus discourse. By 
virtue of a critical consideration of the pivotal premises that undergird these 
antinomies, a distinction can be drawn between structuralist and poststructuralist  
conceptions of social research methodology. Based on a synoptic account of a 
series of binary presuppositional tensions, the chapter aims to unearth the 
principal grounds on which the gradual shift from structuralist to poststructuralist 
methodological agendas in the contemporary social sciences has sought to be 
justified. 
The third chapter scrutinizes the impact of postmodern thought on recent 
developments in sociology. The influence of postmodernism on contemporary 
debates and controversies in sociological analysis has manifested itself – perhaps, 
most conspicuously – in the rise of cultural studies over the past few decades. If 
there is such a thing as a postmodern sociology, its conceptual tools and pre- 
suppositional frameworks are intimately intertwined with a significant paradig- 
matic shift that has contributed to reaching across disciplinary divides within  
the social sciences and the humanities: the cultural  turn. Recent major trends       
in sociology cannot be understood without taking into account the extensive 
influence of cultural studies on cutting-edge variations of social and political 
analysis. It would be erroneous, however, to regard the thinkers and scholars 
whose writings are linked to the ‘cultural turn’ as proselytizing members of a 
homogenous intellectual movement. Whatever one makes of the normative pre- 
suppositions underlying the ‘cultural turn’, it is difficult to ignore its profound 
impact on contemporary sociology, in general, and on numerous attempts to 
develop a postmodern sociology, in particular. As shall be illustrated in this 
chapter, at least three central tensions are at stake in the controversies over the 
alleged differences between modern and postmodern conceptions of sociology: 
(i) industrialism  versus  postindustrialism, (ii) productivism  versus consumerism, and 
(iii) economism versus culturalism. Aware of the fact that these antinomies desig- 
nate major historical developments that have been taking place in recent decades, 
a distinction can be drawn between materialist and postmaterialist conceptions of 
society. Questioning the validity of the thesis that there has been a gradual shift 
from materialist to postmaterialist sociological agendas in the contemporary social 
sciences, this chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the degree to which the 
rise of postmodern thought has significantly shaped present-day understandings 
of culture, the self, and globalization. 
The fourth chapter is concerned with the impact of postmodern thought on 
present-day disputes in historiography. Critical interrogations regarding the nature 
of history (‘What is history?’), the development of history (‘How does history 
evolve?’), and the study of history (‘How can or should we make sense of his- 
tory?’) have always been, and will always continue to be, vital to the elaboration of 
research programmes in the social sciences, owing to their paramount interest in 
the interplay between processes of reproduction and processes of transformation. 
As explained in this chapter, the increasing popularity of postmodern approaches 
to the study of social developments can be seen as an expression of the contingent
 turn in historiography. In light of the postmodern emphasis on spatiotemporal 
contingency, it appears that there is no underlying storyline that determines the 
course of history. In fact, such a view suggests that there is no such thing as a 
‘course of history’, since it conceives of temporal development as a conglomer- 
ate of largely accidental, relatively arbitrary, and discontinuously interconnected 
occurrences. From this vantage point, the collapse of state socialism in Eastern 
and Central Europe at the end of the twentieth century is indicative of the deep 
historical contingency and political questionability of all meta-ideological for- 
mations. As argued in this chapter, the following three tensions are crucial for 
assessing the relevance of postmodern thought to contemporary accounts of his- 
tory: (i) necessity versus contingency, (ii) grand narratives versus small narratives, and 
(iii) continuity versus discontinuity. With these antinomies in mind, a distinction can 
be drawn between reconstructivist and deconstructivist conceptions of historiography. 
The chapter scrutinizes the rationale behind the gradual shift from reconstructivist 
to deconstructivist historiographical agendas in the contemporary social sciences. In 
doing so, it aims to identify the key presuppositional components of a ‘postclassi- 
cal historiography’. 
The fifth chapter grapples with the impact of postmodern thought on contemporary 
conceptions of politics. Arguably, the rise of the politics  of  identity  – often characterized  
as the politics of difference or, alternatively, as the politics of recognition – is  symptomatic 
of the increasingly widespread acceptance of the notion that the quest for human 
autonomy lies at the heart of any societal project aimed at challenging the legiti-  
macy of traditional ways of  coordinating  human  practices.  In  this  context,  the  
role of postmodern thought  in  the  development  of  critical  approaches  to politics 
is reflected in what may be referred to as the autonomous  turn. As illustrated in      
this paradigmatic shift, the discrepancy between  modern  and  postmodern  politics 
stems from three principal tensions: (i) equality versus difference, (ii) society- as-a-
project versus projects-in-society, and (iii) clarity versus ambiguity. Considering these – 
as well as several other – antinomies, a distinction can be drawn between traditional 
and post-traditional conceptions of politics. The chapter looks into the reasons behind 
the gradual shift from traditional to post-traditional  political  agendas  in the 
contemporary social sciences. To this end, a detailed enquiry into the constitutive 
ingredients of a postmodern  politics  will be undertaken. The chapter goes   on to 
formulate 15 theses on cosmopolitanism. In addition, it examines significant points of 
convergence between cosmopolitanism  and  postmodernism,  arguing  that the 
comparative analysis of these two intellectual traditions permits us to grasp 
paradigmatic developments in present-day forms of social  and  political  analysis. 
The chapter draws to a close by suggesting that the principal issues at stake in cur- 
rent debates on cosmopolitanism  and  postmodernism  cannot  be  divorced  from  
the rise of transnational public spheres. 
On the basis of the above-outlined investigation, the sixth and final chapter 
offers various critical reflections on postmodern thought. While acknowledging the 
important contributions made by, as well as the useful insights gained from, the 
aforementioned paradigmatic turns, it is vital to provide a comprehensive account 
of the shortcomings and flaws of postmodern approaches in the social sciences.
 Conscious of the challenging nature of this task, the final chapter proposes to 
question  the validity of postmodern thought by bringing to light  its (i) analytical, 
(ii) paradigmatic, and (iii) normative limitations. 
Before embarking upon an in-depth study of the ‘postmodern turn’, however, it 
is essential to clarify the meaning of three concepts that are central to the 
following enquiry: (i) social theory, (ii) the modern, and (iii) the postmodern. 
 
(i) Social Theory: ‘Modern’ or ‘Postmodern’? 
In mainstream sociological literature, social theory tends to be conceived of as a 
‘modern’ endeavour. In recent decades, however, the view that social theory may 
be – and, indeed, may already have been – converted into a ‘postmodern’ venture 
has become increasingly influential. Let us, for the sake of conceptual clarity, con- 
sider the presuppositional underpinnings of these two positions. 
 
The Idea of a ‘Modern Social Theory’ 
Social theory is both a product and a carrier of modernity. As a product of 
modernity, it can be considered as an analytical endeavour concerned with the 
numerous structural transformations that led to the rise of modern formations of 
society. As a carrier of modernity, it can be regarded as a discursive vehicle contrib- 
uting to several debates on modern conceptions  of society. In brief, social theory 
is an integral component of both the real and the representational constitution of 
the modern world. 
What is social theory? Social theory is the attempt to provide a conceptually informed – 
and, in many cases, empirically substantiated – framework designed to (1) describe, (2) 
analyse, (3) interpret, (4) explain, and (5) assess the constitution, the functioning, and      
the development of social reality, or of particular aspects of social reality, in a more or     
less systematic fashion. 
Just as ‘[s]ocial theory broadly encompasses the general concern with the nature  
of the social in modern society’,2  ‘sociology is part and parcel of modernity’.3    
Just as ‘[i]t is born in modernity, its mission is to theorize about modernity.’4 The 
coming-into-being of social theory is due to the rise of modern society: the former 
is a systematic attempt to grasp both the material and the ideological complexity 
of the latter. Hence, the theoretical problematization of reality in contemporary 
intellectual thought cannot be dissociated from the practical transformation of 
society owing to the emergence of modernity. 
One of the principal aims of modern social theory is to provide conceptual 
tools and illuminating frameworks for examining both the processual and the 
structural conditions underlying the construction of human reality.  Over  the last 
few decades, however, ‘throughout the social sciences and humanities there has 
been a profound change in the conceptualization of the social which in fact 
reflects a deep uncertainty about the development of modern society’.5 This feeling of 
doubt and ambiguity is – perhaps, most obviously – expressed in the crisis of the 
trust and belief in the terminological adequacy and epistemic authority of social- 
scientific enquiries. In light of this legitimacy crisis, it appears that ‘the status of
 social theory vis-à-vis the social sciences has […] become increasingly uncertain 
and needs to be reassessed’.6 It is important to emphasize, however, that the lack 
of clarity regarding the purpose and function of social theory is not necessarily   
a sign of its decline, let alone of its irrelevance for the creation of conceptually 
sophisticated and empirically substantiated research agendas. Rather, it is indica- 
tive of a paradigmatic shift concerning the analytical scope and elucidatory power 
of sociological investigation: 
 
Is sociology dead? As a grand theory, or set of theories that explain everything in a 
particular society, probably yes. As an impulse  to develop a critical  understand-   
ing of what makes human society possible, of how being human is constantly 
being redefined, probably no.7 
 
In other words, rather than conceiving of sociology as a scientific endeavour 
aimed at providing a comprehensive account of both the constitution and the 
evolution of the human universe, it is now widely perceived as a critical project 
that is attentive to the complexity of relationally constructed realities. As such, its 
defenders tend to be suspicious of conceptual models aimed at delivering catch- 
all explanations of causal patterns that are believed to shape, or even determine, 
the nature and development of human societies. As shall be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, the crisis of the universalist ambitions of modern social theory 
is inextricably linked to the advent of the ‘postmodern turn’8 in the contempor- 
ary social sciences.9 In order to substantiate the validity of this claim, we need to 
confront the challenging task of exploring the fundamental differences between 
modern and postmodern forms of social analysis. 
 
The Idea of a ‘Postmodern Social Theory’ 
It is far from uncontroversial whether or not there is such a thing as a ‘postmod- 
ern social theory’.10  The defence of this project, however, tends to be based on  
ten key assumptions. 
(1) Postmodern social theory is an interdisciplinary endeavour. The ‘advocacy 
of social theory’,11 inspired by the ‘critique of sociological theory’,12 is motivated 
by the conviction that we need to overcome disciplinary boundaries and cross- 
fertilize the knowledge generated within different epistemic comfort zones, in 
order to do justice to the fact that there is no analytical approach that can claim  
to possess a monopoly on ultimate representational adequacy, let alone on the 
capacity to capture the entire complexity of human reality.13 
(2) Postmodern social theory is a foundationless endeavour. There appears to be 
more and more of a consensus among contemporary scholars in the social sci- 
ences that ‘the quest for foundations and for a totalizing theory of society’14 is not 
only pointless, but also potentially dangerous.15 The search for objective, norma- 
tive, or subjective grounds on which to justify the possibility of modern science 
turns out to be groundless, if we accept that – in the face of inescapable socio- 
cultural diversity – we cannot identify, let alone endorse, context-transcending 
standards of epistemic validity. Grand sociological theories, obsessed with the
 system-building task of grasping the complexity of society by virtue of big-picture 
explanatory ideologies,16 seem to have lost credibility in a world characterized by 
multiplicity and heterogeneity, rather than by uniformity and homogeneity. 
(3) Postmodern social theory is a directionless endeavour. To be sure, ‘directionless’ – 
in this context – does not signify ‘meaningless’, ‘pointless’, or ‘clueless’. Rather,   
it indicates that we, as critical researchers, should resist the temptation to invent 
conceptual apparatuses that lead to the ‘false closure’17 of theoretical frameworks, 
preventing us from ‘prying open present and future social possibilities’18 and 
from ‘detecting fluidity and porousness’,19 rather than discovering determinacy 
and eternity, in the daily construction of human reality. A social theory without 
guarantees ‘carries no promise of liberation […] of a society free of domination’,20 
thereby rejecting the teleological spirit underlying classical accounts of human 
emancipation.21 
(4) Postmodern social theory is a public endeavour. As such, it cannot make 
any major claims about the constitution of society without empirically engaging 
with the everyday processes that shape the development of reality. It will lose its 
wider ‘social and intellectual importance’22 if ‘it is disengaged from the conflicts 
and public debates’23 taking place on a daily basis. The ‘plea for a “public sociol- 
ogy”, which uses expert knowledge to promote debate with and amongst various 
non-academic publics’,24 is aimed at recognizing the following: to the extent that 
sociological analysis ‘has turned inward and is largely self-referential’,25 it runs 
the risk of degrading itself to an elitist language game, whose autopoietic con- 
ceptual frameworks are disconnected from everyday concerns and experiences. 
Postmodern social theory, however, is public not only in the sense that it engages 
directly with quotidian realities ‘on the ground’, but also in the sense that it 
rejects the clear-cut separation between ‘common sense’ and ‘expert knowledge’. 
In this regard, the distinction between ‘traditional public sociology’ and ‘organic 
public sociology’ seems useful.26 The former ‘addresses an amorphous, invisible 
and mainstream public’, whereas the latter ‘actively engages with a specific, vis- 
ible and politically organized group of people’.27  Not only do we need to avoid    
a scenario in which ‘[s]ociological theory […] is produced and consumed almost 
exclusively by sociological theorists’,28 and not only do we need to discard main- 
stream notions of ‘professional sociology’ and ‘policy sociology’,29 but, moreover, 
we need to take on the challenge of cross-fertilizing academic and non-academic dis- 
courses. This can be achieved by doing away with the traditional division of labour 
between the ‘scientific enlighteners’, who direct and control their epistemic inferi- 
ors ‘from above’, and the ‘ordinary to-be-enlightened’, who follow and obey their 
epistemic superiors ‘from below’.30 
(5) Postmodern social theory is a situationist endeavour. Owing to its interest in 
the spatiotemporal specificities of locally experienced realities, it ‘speaks the lan- 
guage of particularity’,31 rather than obeying the logic of the search for lawfulness 
and universality. In this sense, it is driven by ‘the more modest aspiration of a 
relentless defense of immediate, local pleasures and struggles for justice’32 instead 
of aiming ‘to uncover a logic of society’,33 ‘to discover the one true vocabulary that 
mirrors the social universe’34 and ‘to find a universal language, a conceptual
 casuistry that can assess the truth of all social languages’35 and thereby ‘articulate 
humanity’s universal condition’.36 On this view, the cognitive and affective 
sensibility for situational idiosyncrasy obliges us to face up to the irreducibility of 
all life-worldly realities. What matters to the postmodern eye is what happens on 
the groundless grounds of diversified social practices, rather than in the sterile 
and abstract frameworks of foundationalist social theories. If we abandon the 
futile project of defining ‘our principal task as providing foundations for 
sociology’,37  as ‘giving ultimate reasons’,38 and as delivering ‘a universal 
epistemic rationale that provides objective, value-neutral  standards’,39  then  we  
are  in  a  position  to recognize that the complexity of materially and symbolically 
differentiated realities cannot be captured in terms of the context-transcending 
frameworks and principles of grand sociological theories. 
(6) Postmodern social theory is a pragmatic endeavour. Given its anti-founda- 
tionalist and anti-universalist outlook, the ‘postmodern spirit’ – if we may char- 
acterize it as such – ‘suggests that the search for ultimate or universal grounds  
for our conceptual strategies should be abandoned in favor of local, pragmatic 
justifications’.40 Such  a  pragmatist  approach  to  social  existence  is  interested 
in discursive processes accomplished by ordinary actors capable of mobilizing 
their cognitive resources in relationally constituted – and, hence, sociologically 
diverse – contexts. A ‘pragmatic turn’41 in social theory has various significant 
advantages, notably that ‘[i]t expands the number of parties who may participate 
more or less as equals in a debate about society’42 and, therefore, permits us to do 
justice to the fact that human actors – that is, both experts and laypersons – are 
equipped with reflective, critical, and moral capacities.43 In fact, the analysis of 
ordinary practices of justification reinforces the postmodern commitment to the 
aforementioned principles: 
 
• different academic disciplines and different intellectual traditions generate dif- 
ferent standards of validity (interdisciplinarity); 
• different life forms produce different language games sustained by incommen- 
surable normative criteria (foundationlessness); 
• different individual and collective actors are motivated by different interests 
and aspirations, lacking a common denominator in terms of one overarching 
telos shared by all of them (directionlessness); 
• different societies are shaped by different struggles taking place in different 
forms of public life (publicness); 
• different objective, normative, and subjective concerns arise in different con- 
texts (situatedness); and 
• different grammars of justification emanate from – and, in turn, reinforce – 
different regimes of action (usefulness). 
 
In short, the ‘pragmatic turn’ draws attention to the existential significance of 
social practices. 
(7) Postmodern social theory is an ethno-conscious endeavour. To be aware of 
the cultural specificity of one’s epistemic claims to validity requires recognizing
 that the very attempt to overcome ethnocentrism confirms its inevitable impact 
upon all forms of knowledge production. In this regard, the point is to take the 
following insight into consideration: since human beings are socially situated 
actors, their symbolically mediated encounter with the world is embedded in 
spatiotemporally specific background horizons. Hermeneutics, in this sense, is not 
exclusively a theoretical matter of scholastic interpretations, developed and codi- 
fied by professional philosophers, but also, more importantly, a practical affair of 
everyday understandings, constructed and mobilized by ordinary actors. Indeed, 
all modes of knowledge generation – irrespective of whether they are scientific or 
non-scientific, academic or non-academic, based on expertise or guided by com- 
mon sense – represent culturally specific practices performed by spatiotemporally 
embedded entities. If we accept the sociocultural particularity underlying all epis- 
temic claims to validity, then we are obliged to face up to the structuring power 
exercised by the ineluctable weight of historicity. ‘The notion that foundational 
discourses cannot avoid being local and ethnocentric is pivotal to what has come 
to be called postmodernism’.44 The major difference  between  foundationalist  
and anti-foundationalist approaches, then, is not that the former transcend, 
whereas the latter remain trapped in, the culturally specific background hori- 
zons of their emergence; rather, they are divided by the fact that the former  
deny, whereas the latter recognize, the spatiotemporal contingency of all epistemic 
claims concerning the constitution of reality. To be ethno-conscious means to be 
aware of the fact that all modes of cognition – including the most reflexive ones – 
are influenced by context-dependent prejudices, preconceptions, and 
presuppositions. 
(8) Postmodern social theory is a socio-conscious endeavour. As such, it insists 
not only upon the cultural specificity that shapes epistemic communities, but 
also, in a broader sense, upon the relational contingency underlying the seemingly 
most liberating forms of human agency. Indeed, it is due to this relational contin- 
gency that the human condition is permeated by radical indeterminacy: highly 
differentiated societies produce intersectionally constituted actors expected to 
take on multiple roles, develop plural identities, and carry various coexisting – 
and, often, conflicting – selves within themselves. In light of this relational con- 
tingency, characterized by varying degrees of social intersectionality, one of the 
key epistemological questions posed by the postmodern mind is the following: 
 
How can a knowing subject, who has particular interests and prejudices by virtue 
of living in a specific society at a particular historical juncture and occupying   
a specific social position defined by his or her class, gender, race, sexual orien- 
tation, and ethnic and religious status, produce concepts, explanations, and 
standards of validity that are universally valid?45 
 
The answer given by postmodernists in response to this query can be summar- 
ized as follows: since all knowledge claims are relationally contingent in terms of 
both their formulation, by a particular actor, and their reception, by other actors, 
there are no universal criteria against which to judge the adequacy of epistemic validity.
 Put differently, the attainment of epistemic validity cannot be divorced from the 
assertion of symbolic authority  emanating  from  the  need  for  the  recognition 
of social legitimacy. To be sure, in the social world, recognition can be granted 
explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvert- 
ently; whatever their performative specificity, however, claims to epistemic valid- 
ity are imbued with relationally constituted struggles over social legitimacy. The 
question of whether we consider a statement right or wrong depends not only on 
what is being said, but also on who says it when, where, and to whom. For objectiv- 
ity (‘What?’) is – inevitably – a matter of social authority (‘Who?’), spatiotemporal 
contextuality (‘Where and when?’), and interactional relationality (‘To whom?’). 
The idea of abstract epistemic universality evaporates when confronted with the 
multilayered constitution of normative – that is, value-laden, meaning-laden, 
perspective-laden, interest-laden, power-laden, and tension-laden – realities. 
(9) Postmodern social theory is a pluralist endeavour. To assume that ‘epistemic 
suspicion is at the core of postmodernism’46 means to acknowledge that, far from 
seeking to invent ‘a universally valid language of truth’,47  it is concerned with the 
critical exploration of, and active involvement in, ‘heterogeneous struggles’48 
around a multiplicity of sociological variables – such as class, gender, ethnic-   ity, 
age, and ability. Viewed in this light, one of the most serious limitations of 
classical sociological thought is that its ‘flat, contentless general categories seem  
inevitably to ignore or repress social differences’.49 Highly differentiated societies 
are centreless formations in the sense that they lack a structural, ideological, or 
behavioural epicentre from which all institutions, discourses, and practices derive 
and upon which peripheral areas of interaction, or derivative forms of existence, 
are parasitical. In the postmodern jungle of flows, networks, and diversified local 
events, the human actor is ‘a self with multiple identities and group affiliations, 
which is entangled in heterogeneous struggles with multiple possibilities for empower- 
ment’.50 Given both the real and the representational complexity of materially and 
symbolically differentiated societies, we need to abandon the modern project of 
developing big-picture ideologies and face up to the existence of situation-laden 
normativities created in response to relationally constituted realities. In the post- 
modern universe, there is no such thing as an overriding agenda that can justifi- 
ably declare to possess a normative monopoly in the landscape of decentred and 
diversified subjectivities. 
(10) Postmodern social theory is a historicist endeavour. One of the main limita- 
tions of classical sociological thought, undermining its applicability to the study 
of highly differentiated forms of sociality, is its ‘quest for foundations’,51  which   
is expressed in ‘the project of creating a general theory’,52 understood as ‘an over- 
arching totalizing conceptual framework that would be true for all times and all 
places’.53 In this respect, three issues are particularly worth mentioning: 
 
A. Ethnocentrism: ‘Human history in these modernist tales really meant Western 
history.’54 Their capacity to conceal ‘the mark of their own national origin’55 
permits them to present their explanatory insights into social developments ‘as 
if their particular pattern were of world-historical importance’.56 
 B. Evolutionism: In classical sociological thought, ‘[n]on-Western societies [are] rel- 
egated to a marginal position in past, present, and future history’.57 Following 
this modernist logic, historical events and trends can be measured against the 
teleological benchmark of ‘Progress’,58 which can be defined in numerous – 
notably, social, cultural, political, economic, technological, scientific, religious, 
demographic, and civilizational – terms. ‘The grand narratives of industrializa- 
tion, modernization, secularization, democratization, these sweeping stories that 
presume to uncover a uniform social process in a multitude of different societies 
[…] should be abandoned.’59 
C. Dichotomism: Teleological metanarratives are ‘stories with […] simplistic binary 
schemes’,60 such as These versus Antithese (Georg W. F. Hegel), Gemeinschaft 
versus Gesellschaft (Ferdinand Tönnies), Kapitalismus versus Sozialismus/ 
Kommunismus (Karl Marx), Wertrationalität versus Zweckrationalität (Max 
Weber), or solidarité mécanique versus solidarité organique (Émile Durkheim) – 
to mention only a few examples.61 Universalist evolutionary and binary cat- 
egories artificially homogenize the heterogeneously constituted constellations 
of historical realities. If, however, we acknowledge the sociohistorical specific- 
ity underlying all epistemic claims to validity, then we are obliged to expose 
the spatiotemporal relativity permeating the symbolic authority asserted by 
universalist accounts of history. 
 
(ii) ‘The Modern’ 
The concept of ‘the modern’ is not simply a recent – or, tautologically speaking, 
an exclusively ‘modern’ – reference point; rather, it has a ‘premodern’ history. 
‘The word modern is said to derive from the Latin word modo, meaning “just 
now”. Thus, modern implies belonging to the present or to recent times, and  the 
word has been part of the English language since at least 1500.’62 ‘To be modern 
was to be contemporary, to witness the present moment. The idea of “the moment” 
is central to the time consciousness of modernity and expresses a tension between 
present and past’.63 
Just as it is important to be aware of the etymological roots of the word ‘modern’, 
it is crucial to recognize that the idea of ‘the modern’ has been on the agenda  
long before the rise of what is commonly described as ‘modern society’. In fact, 
the members of any epoch may characterize themselves as ‘modern’ insofar as 
they consider the historical phase in which they find themselves situated as a 
contemporary period. In every spatiotemporal context, ‘the now’ is unavoidably 
constructed within the temporal horizon of ‘the already’; ‘the present’ necessarily 
exists in relation to ‘the past’; ‘being’ always develops in the lap of ‘the hitherto- 
been’. ‘The word “modern” was first employed in the late fifth century in order to 
distinguish the present, now officially Christian, from the pagan and Roman past.’64 
‘For the Christian thinkers of the early medieval age, the modern referred to the 
contemporary period of the early Church. Modernity was thus defined in opposition to 
the pagan period, which had been overcome.’65 Hence, the present of modernity is 
situated in relation to the past of antiquity. The self-consciousness of a new epoch
 arises through its explicit disassociation from, and transcendence of, the historical 
phase by which it is preceded. What distinguishes modernity from premodern eras, 
then, is not its awareness of the present as such, but its awareness of a specific – 
that is, unprecedented – kind of present. The question that poses itself, therefore, 
is to what extent it is justified to characterize modernity as a historical stage based 
on a set of unparalleled societal features. 
In a broad sense, the concept of modernity ‘refers to modes of social life or organisa- 
tion which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which 
subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence’.66 In other words, 
modernity is inextricably linked to the structural and ideological transformations 
which began to take place in Europe towards the end of the seventeenth century 
and which led to the gradual consolidation of a radically new type of society, not 
only in Europe but, eventually, across the globe. One of the most challenging 
ambitions in sociology has always been to make sense of this historical transition 
by seeking to identify and examine the key factors that, eventually, resulted in 
the rise of modernity. 
Without a doubt, the founding figures of the sociological project – Karl Marx, 
Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber67 – diverge substantially in terms of their inter- 
pretation of modernity. Yet, they share not only the ontological assumption that 
modern society is inherently dynamic and progressive, but also the methodological 
conviction that the causal mechanisms shaping the course of modern history can 
be systematically and empirically studied. Modern society may be driven by the 
productive forces of capitalism, as maintained by Marx;68 it may be hold together by 
the organic solidarity brought about by industrialism, as suggested by Durkheim;69 or, 
it may be tantamount to an increasingly disenchanted world, owing to the prepon- 
derance of bureaucratic rationalization, as claimed by Weber.70 
Irrespective of the considerable differences between their explanatory 
approaches, the three thinkers converge in their aim to shed light on the underlying 
structural forces that govern the development of modern society. In doing so, their writ- 
ings illustrate that, although previous epochs may also be characterized as con- 
stantly developing historical formations, one feature of modernity is particularly 
striking: namely, the fact that its transformative potential – in terms of its nature, 
pace, scope, impact, and civilizational significance – is unprecedented.71 
With this interpretation in mind, the postmodern critique of classical social 
theory is not primarily concerned with the conceptual and methodological dif- 
ferences that exist between the founding figures of sociology. Rather, it focuses 
on their common presuppositional ground, notably by taking issue with the 
assumption that the modern world is driven by a ‘big story’, which can be dis- 
closed through the scientific study of social structures and social processes. 
In general terms, the project of modernity72 stands for a normative endeavour in 
that its advocates believe that the course of history can be both understood and 
shaped by conscious subjects capable of purposive action and critical thinking. On this 
account, reason enables human beings not only to reflect upon and interpret, but 
also to act upon and change the world in accordance with individual and soci- 
etal needs. The project of modernity is inextricably linked to ‘the project of the
 Enlightenment’.73 In essence, the latter represents a discursive manifestation of the 
former. From an Enlightenment perspective, the emancipatory potential of modern 
society is rooted in people’s ability to take on their role as morally responsible entities 
capable of replacing the prejudices permeating traditional and dogmatic worldviews 
with insights gained from discursive forms of critical reasoning. ‘Modernity, as the self- 
consciousness of the Enlightenment, was self-evidently the emancipation of human 
beings from the prejudices of tradition. Modernity is thus defined by reference to 
the critique of tradition.’74 Put differently, modernity can be conceived of as a his- 
torical condition allowing for people’s emancipation from preconceptions based 
on tradition and common sense and, hence, for the construction of a society 
whose destiny is determined by the species-distinctive potential of rationality and 
oriented towards the realization of human autonomy. 
From a postmodern standpoint, however, intellectual thought that is inspired by 
the Enlightenment project is problematic  to  the  extent  that  it  is  motivated 
by three key ambitions: (a) the ambition to uncover the underlying mechanisms 
that determine both the constitution and the evolution of society; (b) the ambi- 
tion to give a coherent account of the nature and the development of the human 
subject; and (c) the ambition to explore the preconditions for the possibility of 
social change, understood as a historical process steered by the species-constitutive 
power of reason and expressed in the conscious transformation of human reality.75 
Modern social theory is the systematic attempt to explore the extent to which 
human actors are not only situated in, and constrained by, their social environ- 
ment but, in addition, have the capacity to determine the conditions of their 
existence by virtue of purposive reason (Verstand) as well as the ability to imbue 
their lives in accordance with justifiable principles derived from normative rea- 
son (Vernunft). Human beings, then, are confronted with the species-constitutive 
task of coming to terms with both the intuitive ‘withinness’ and the reflective 
‘beyondness’ of their tension-laden existence. Modernity is a historical condition 
constructed by subjects capable of acting upon, attributing meaning to, and con- 
stantly reinventing their unique place in the universe. 
 
Key Dimensions of Modernity 
Given the complexity of large-scale historical developments, it is no surprise that 
different social theorists focus on different features of the modern condition. 
Surely, some factors have been more significant than others in terms of their 
overall impact upon the rise and development of modernity; indeed, it remains 
open to debate how the historical role of each of these factors should be inter- 
preted. Whatever the disagreements sparked by such a dispute may be, however, 
the following six levels of analysis are particularly important for a comprehensive 
understanding of the sociohistorical conditions that led to the rise of  modernity.76 
(1) On the economic level, the rise of modernity is inextricably linked to 
industrialization. The rapid expansion of industrial capitalism, from the eight- 
eenth century onwards, has been a key driving force of the modern age. As        
an unprecedentedly dynamic economic system, industrial capitalism – notably  
in terms of its capacity to generate constantly evolving production, distribution,
 and consumption patterns – has had a profound impact upon the development 
of modernity, directly or indirectly affecting every sphere of social life. The drive 
for continuous invention, innovation, and transformation lies at the heart of 
industrial capitalism, illustrating that its productive forces are more dynamic  
and powerful than those of any previous economic system in the history of 
humankind. 
(2) On the epistemic level, the rise of modernity is intimately interrelated with 
rationalization. Modern rationalization processes are inconceivable without the 
unstoppable growth of systematic forms of knowledge production, epitomized in 
the massive influence of science on both private and public dimensions of social 
existence. The production, growth, and refinement of scientific knowledge have 
several far-reaching implications for the development of modernity, essentially on 
two levels: on the discursive level, the power of science allows for theoretical pro- 
gress, based on logical arguments, empirical research, expert controversies, and the 
testing of truth claims through methodical processes of verification and falsifica- 
tion; on the material level, the power of science manifests itself in practical progress, 
leading to technological advancements driven by the ceaseless transformation   
of the means of production, forces of production, and relations of production. 
Owing to both the theoretical and the practical impact of science, the influence  of 
traditional sources of authority – such as religion – has been undermined both 
ideologically, in terms of interpretation and legitimation processes, and institution- 
ally, in terms of ritualization and habitualization processes. 
(3) On the political level, the rise of modernity is intimately interrelated with 
ideologization. To be sure, this is  not  to  contend  that  political  ideologies  did 
not exist before the rise of modernity; nor is this to affirm that ‘politics’ can be 
reduced to ‘ideology’. Rather, this is to recognize the fact that modernity – argu- 
ably, more so than any previous historical period – has been crucially shaped by the 
elaboration, justification, divulgation, application, institutionalization, and constant 
revision of political programmes founded on ideological principles. Indisputably, the 
dynamics arising from the theoretical and the intellectual rivalry, as much as from 
the practical and the strategic competition, between different political ideologies 
have left a pluralist mark on modern history. Rightly or wrongly, one may come 
to the conclusion that liberalism constitutes the triumphant political ideology of 
the early twenty-first century. Whatever one makes of this assessment, however, 
there is little doubt that at least five major political ideologies have substantially 
shaped the development of modern history: anarchism, communism/socialism, 
liberalism, conservatism, and fascism. Of course, it is possible to identify significant 
points of convergence and divergence, as well as noteworthy points of partial 
integration and cross-fertilization, between these prominent ideologies.77 Notably, 
they can be compared and contrasted in terms of their respective conceptions of 
‘humanity’, ‘society’, ‘the economy’, ‘the polity’, and ‘history’, but also – more 
fundamentally – in terms of the role they have played in the development of 
modernity. However one may wish to evaluate, or even measure, their past and 
present impact on society, recent history cannot be understood without the study 
of modern political ideologies. 
 (4) On the organizational level, the rise of modernity cannot be divorced from 
large-scale processes of bureaucratization. The modern quest for the control over 
reality by virtue of instrumental rationality is epitomized in the spread of bureau- 
cracies in various domains of society, particularly the economy and the polity. 
Economic power is expressed in the control over the constitution of a particular 
mode of production. Epistemic power manifests itself in the influence over the 
composition of paradigmatic forms of cognition. Political  power is reflected in 
the capacity to shape real and representational structures, as well as material and 
ideological resources, mobilized to determine the coordination of social practices. 
Organizational power is crucial to the efficient, and more or less predictable, admin- 
istration of institutional domains in large-scale societies. Regardless of whether 
one conceives of modernity as an era characterized by the emergence of a partly 
or totally administered world, the instrumental rationality underlying advanced 
types of bureaucracy constitutes an integral element of modern societies.78 Surely, 
bureaucracies have existed for a long time; it is due to the unprecedented degree 
of systemic complexity that they reached in the context of modernity, however, 
that powerful – that is, above all, authoritarian – political regimes in the twentieth 
century succeeded in exercising totalitarian control over their societies. 
(5) On the cultural level, the rise of modernity is accompanied by processes of 
individualization. As Durkheimian scholars point out, the transition from ‘tradi- 
tional society’ to ‘modern society’, expressed in the replacement of ‘mechanic 
solidarity’ by ‘organic solidarity’, led to a shift in existential focus from ‘the cult 
of God’ to ‘the cult of the individual’.79 With the emergence of the modern age, the 
normative expectations thrown at human actors began to change dramatic- ally. 
According to individualist parameters, people are not only allowed but also 
required to pick and choose from a menu of identities and thereby develop a 
sense of personality. There is a long list comprising sources of identity that are 
crucial to the construction of personhood in modern society: class, gender, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, ‘race’, cultural preferences, life-style, religion, age, ability, 
or political ideology – to mention only a few. Paradoxically, individualization 
processes are inconceivable  without  socialization  processes,  and  vice  versa. 80  
A person can develop a sense of identity only in relation to society, just as society is 
an indispensable resource for the creation of both individual and collective identi- 
ties. Granted, the constraining power of social structures, institutions, norms, and 
expectations continues to exist within the historical framework of modernity. 
Compared to traditional life forms,  however,  modern  societies  –  particularly 
its liberal variants – offer substantially more room  for  individual  freedom  – 
and, hence, for people’s capacity to convert themselves into protagonists of their 
own destiny – than its premodern counterparts. 
(6) On the philosophical level, the rise of modernity cannot be separated from pro- 
cesses of emancipation inspired by the Enlightenment.81 ‘In the most general sense, 
the concept of emancipation refers to an entity’s liberation from control, depend- 
ence, restraint, confinement,  restriction,  repression,  slavery,  or domination.’82 
Thus, in Enlightenment thought, emancipation processes are commonly associated 
with ‘the transition from heteronomy to autonomy, from dependence to freedom, or from
 alienation to self-realization’.83 The view that human beings have the capacity to con- 
vert themselves into protagonists of emancipation, which is central to the project of 
modernity, is expressed in several intellectual traditions that are based on different 
notions of the subject. Among the most influential conceptions of ‘the subject’ in 
modern social and political thought are the following: ‘the thinking subject’ (René 
Descartes),   ‘the rational  subject’  (Immanuel Kant),   ‘the recognitive subject’  (Georg 
W. F. Hegel), ‘the working subject’ (Karl Marx), ‘the unconscious subject’ (Sigmund 
Freud), ‘the linguistic subject’ (Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul 
Ricœur), ‘the experiencing subject’ (Edmund Husserl), ‘the political subject’ (Hannah 
Arendt), and ‘the communicative subject’ (Jürgen Habermas).84 As reflected in the 
variety of these approaches, the question of what kind of processes can, or should, 
be characterized as ‘liberating’ remains a cause of controversy. ‘[T]here is little doubt, 
however, that one feature that all forms of emancipation have in common is that 
they involve an individual or a collective entity’s assertion of sovereignty and its 
exemption from one or various sources of relatively arbitrary control’.85 Although 
there has never been a universal consensus on the nature of human emancipation  
in Enlightenment thought, the attempt to create a society capable of giving its mem- 
bers the opportunity to realize their species-constitutive potential can be regarded as 
a normative cornerstone underpinning the project of modernity. 
 
The above overview, which comprises the key factors that have contributed to the 
rise of modernity, is far from exhaustive. It nevertheless illustrates the following: 
in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the principal components 
that led to the emergence, and allowed for the rapid development, of modern 
societies, a multifactorial analysis of different, interrelated, and – to some extent – 
overlapping dimensions is needed. Moreover, such a multilevel examination sug- 
gests that, paradoxically, the aforementioned elements constitute both reasons   
for and consequences of the rise of modernity: as contributing factors, the pivotal 
role that they play in the unfolding of historical developments has made the 
modern condition possible; as tangible outcomes,  they  have  been  shaped  by 
the historical circumstances that they have themselves brought about. Hence, the 
dialectics of modernity emanates from the interplay between numerous – notably 
(1) economic, (2) epistemic, (3) political, (4) organizational, (5) cultural, and (6) 
philosophical – factors. These factors constitute, at once, the precondition for and 
the result of the emergence of modern societal formations, which came into being 
in Europe from the seventeenth century onwards and which, subsequently, began 
to have a substantial impact upon civilizational developments across the world. 
 
The Ambivalence of Modernity 
As several commentators have pointed out, modernity is a historical condition 
characterized by the existence of different levels of ambivalence.86 Three levels of 
ambivalence are particularly worth mentioning when reflecting upon the condi- 
tion of modernity. 
(1) On the ontological level, we can distinguish between a modernity in itself and 
a modernity for itself. The former describes modernity ‘as a historical event, a social
 condition, an epoch in historical time’.87 The latter, by contrast, refers to modern- 
ity ‘as an idea […] a cultural impulse, a time consciousness’.88 In other words, 
modernity exists both as an objective mode of being, which comes to the fore in 
the presence of substantive realities, and as a reflexive mode of being, which is 
aware of its own constellation as a symbolically mediated and phenomenologi- 
cally represented actuality. 
(2) On the normative  level, we can distinguish between a dark  modernity  and 
a bright modernity. The former denotes the ensemble of the repressive facets of 
modernity, which emanate from the quest for domination, epitomized in the 
historical impact of instrumental reason. These are intimately associated with varia- 
tions of control – such as power, authority, order, discipline, obedience, enclosure, 
and heteronomy – and materialize themselves in social processes of domination, 
regulation, exploitation, alienation, fragmentation, exclusion, and discrimina- 
tion. The latter, on the other hand, designates the emancipatory aspects of the 
modern condition, which can be uncovered by critical reason. These are expressed 
in Enlightenment ideals – such as progress, tolerance, liberty, equality, solidarity, 
dignity, sovereignty, and autonomy – and manifest themselves in social processes 
of liberation, self-determination, and unification.89 
(3) On the spatiotemporal level, we can distinguish between a backward-looking 
modernity and a forward-looking modernity. The former is oriented towards the past: it 
is imbued with ‘a nostalgia and sadness for the passing of an unretrievable organic 
unity’90 and deeply suspicious of the ‘great faith in the promise of reason to bring 
about freedom’.91 Conversely, the latter is oriented towards the future: indeed, ‘the 
secular concept of modernity expresses the conviction that the future has already 
begun: it is the epoch that lives for the future, that opens itself up to the novelty 
of the future’.92 In light of this spatiotemporal ambivalence, which expresses a 
schizophrenic idealization of both the past and the future, it appears that ‘[t]he 
idea of modernity is […] a projection backwards as much as forwards’,93 as illus- 
trated in the tension-laden impact of both conservatism and utopianism upon the 
development of modern history. To conceive of modernity, first and foremost, as 
a transformative historical condition that seeks to come to terms with the present 
by retrieving seemingly lost elements from the past means to consider the restora- 
tion of vanished social arrangements, practices, and values as a precondition for 
the salvation of the present and for the avoidance of the decline of the West.94 By 
contrast, to define modernity ‘as an epoch turned to the future conceived as likely 
to be different from and possibly better than the present and the past’95 means to 
interpret the orientation towards the yet-to-come as a key motivational ingredient 
of a distinctive period. 
The aforementioned levels of ambivalence are central to the era commonly 
characterized as modernity. In ontological terms, modernity exists both as an 
objective and as a reflexive condition. In normative terms, modernity exists both as 
a disempowering and as an empowering condition. In spatiotemporal terms, modern- 
ity exists both as a backward-looking and as a forward-looking condition. 
Owing to this paradoxical complexity, and far from being reducible to a one- 
dimensional historical reality, modernity can be conceived of as a tension-laden
 age pervaded by existential ambiguity. In fact, the tensions arising from the con- 
tradictory relationship between ‘being-there’ and ‘being-aware’, between ‘being- 
dominated’ and ‘being-emancipated’, and between ‘being-as-always-already-been’ 
and ‘being-as-yet-to-come’ concern modernity not only as a collectively con- 
structed moment of society but also as an individually experienced reference 
point of historically embedded subjectivities. On this account, it appears that 
every ordinary human entity is (1) both an objective being immersed in reality and 
a subjective being aware of reality, (2) both a constrained being struggling with the 
limitations imposed upon it by the world and a purposive being seeking to act upon 
the world, as well as (3) both a regressive being  yearning to retrieve the past and 
a progressive being looking forward to the future. Existential ambivalence may be 
regarded as a constitutive feature of human selfhood;96 in the context of modern- 
ity, it is has been elevated to the status of a foundational condition permeating 
the entirety of a historical era. 
 
(iii) ‘The Postmodern’ 
For at least the past three decades, the concept of ‘the postmodern’ has been a 
major source of debate in the social sciences.97 Taking into account that the 
concept of ‘the modern’ is highly contentious, it is not difficult to imagine that  
the concept of ‘the postmodern’ is hardly less controversial than its predecessor. 
However one interprets the concept of ‘the postmodern’, there is little doubt that 
it is generally associated with the idea of epochal change: ‘The discourse of the post 
is sometimes connected with an apocalyptic sense of rupture, of the passing of the old 
and the advent of the new.’98 The ‘postization’ of a whole variety of different socio- 
logical concepts appears to have been a fashionable trend in social and political 
thought from the late twentieth century until the present. Yet, the semantic crea- 
tivity of contemporary academic discourses is not necessarily a sign of their intel- 
lectual originality. The validity of the gradual ‘postization’ of the social sciences 
should not be taken for granted; rather, it has to be critically examined in order 
for its analysis to move beyond the status of provocative rhetorical speculation. 
The list of the contemporary proliferation of neologisms that  contain  the 
prefix ‘post’ is long: postmodernism, poststructuralism, postrationalism, post- 
foundationalism, post-transcendentalism, postcolonialism, postmaterialism, 
postindustrialism, post-Fordism, post-Keynesianism, postsocialism, postcom- 
munism, post-Marxism, postutopianism, postsecularism, and posthumanism – to 
mention only a few. The thriving multiplicity of these catch-all concepts seems to 
suggest ‘that we […] live in a post-something  era’99 or, in a more holistic sense, in  
a post-everything100 period, characterized by a diffuse sense of afterness.101 The ontol- 
ogy of the contemporary world, then, is frequently portrayed as a post-ontology. 
Nevertheless, the prefix ‘post’ is problematic in at least three respects. 
(1) There is a definitional problem. As a periodizing term, the prefix ‘post’ deline- 
ates a concept negatively in terms of what it is not. Its only affirmative feature is its 
temporal delimitation concerning a condition that succeeds – that is, comes ‘after’ – 
something else. Thus, it defines a state of affairs in opposition to another – hitherto
 existing – situation, yet without indicating what it actually stands for. As a result, 
one gets the impression that ‘[w]e are living in a new world, a world that does not 
know how to define itself by what it is, but only by what it has just-now ceased to 
be.’102 Hence, the prefix ‘post’ tells us what the present age is not, rather than 
what it is. ‘The post-mode is itself a temporal concept, implying a “before” and  
an “after”.’103 This is not to posit that postmodern thought necessarily lacks a 
conception of the present; this is to recognize, however, that its understanding of 
the ‘here and now’ is based on the assumption that the contemporary era constitutes 
a historical condition characterized by radical indeterminacy. 
(2) Closely related to the previous point, there is an interpretive problem. If his- 
torical periods are defined primarily on the basis of the prefixes ‘pre’ and ‘post’, 
and thus in terms of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, then the nature of the now is in dan- 
ger of being systematically faded out. To historicize society by relying exclusively 
on ‘post-istic’ readings of social reality is problematic to the extent that such a 
prefix-dependent view ‘leaves unquestioned the position […] of the present from 
which one is supposed to be able to achieve a legitimate perspective on a chrono- 
logical succession’.104 A thorough analysis of the ‘after’, however, must imply an 
equally conscientious study of the ‘now’. If the present is to be characterized in 
terms of whatever form of ‘afterness’, we need to provide a systematic account   
of what this alleged ‘afterness’ represents.  A  comprehensive  reflection  upon 
‘the present’ must entail a thorough consideration of ‘the past’, just as a critical 
examination of ‘the past’ is inconceivable without conscious attentiveness to the 
historical conditions of ‘the present’. In order to understand what society is, we 
need to grasp what society has become. A ‘post-istic’ conception of the present 
must prove that it does not fall into the trap of interpreting the present exclu- 
sively in terms of the future. History is imbued with the temporal continuum between 
past, present, and future. 
(3) There is a normative problem. Paradoxically, if we define one concept in 
opposition to another concept, we run the risk of creating a sense of terminological 
heteronomy. No matter how radical the transformation of the ‘now’ into the ‘after’ 
may be, the latter can emerge only within the temporal horizon of the former.   
To define the present as ‘postmodern’ means to acknowledge the powerful status 
of ‘the modern’. If the notion of ‘the postmodern’ is understood, literally, as a 
condition characterized by an ‘after-now’, then the ineluctable dependence of  
the ‘after’ upon the ‘now’ becomes evident. The concept of ‘the postmodern’ does 
not discredit or undermine, but, on the contrary, implicitly acknowledges and 
reinforces the continuing relevance of the concept of ‘the modern’.105 Of course, 
contemporary thinkers may contend that we have moved beyond  the condition 
of modernity. Notwithstanding the question of whether it is real or imagined, 
however, the epochal transition to postmodernity cannot be dissociated from its 
intrinsic connection to modernity, for the former stands within the horizon of the 
latter. The transcendent power of postmodernity is inseparable from its historical attach- 
ment to the condition of modernity. 
We have already briefly considered the meaning of the term ‘modern’. In a 
similar vein, we need to take into account the etymological development of the term
 ‘postmodern’. Interestingly, the first instances of the use of the word ‘postmodern’ 
can be found not in sociology or social theory, but in art and literature. To be pre- 
cise, the initial employment of this term in modern writings can be traced back  
to the realms of visual art and poetry: 
 
In the earliest usage unearthed thus far, around 1870 an English painter, John 
Watkins Chapman, described as ‘postmodern’ painting that was supposedly 
more modern than French impressionism […]. The concept was similarly 
employed in literature in 1934 and again in 1942 to describe a related tendency 
in Hispanic poetry […].106 
 
Referring to experimental tendencies in Western arts and architecture from the 
1940 or 1950s onwards, postmodernism stands  for  both  the  continuation  and  
the transcendence of modernism, representing an eclectic mixture of different 
traditions of both the immediate and the distant past. By contrast, debates on   
the nature of the postmodern in the social sciences constitute a relatively recent 
phenomenon, that is, a discursive feature of the late twentieth century.107 As shall 
be demonstrated in the present study, these disputes are crucial to understanding 
the paradigmatic shifts that have significantly reshaped the social sciences over 
the past few decades. 
To the extent that conceptual definitions are supposed to be rationally justifi- 
able and objective, and to the extent that postmodernists question the possibility 
of providing epistemic foundations for the representational validity of rational- 
ity and objectivity, the attempt to develop a non-modern description of postmodernity 
appears to be a contradiction in terms. On the face of it, there is no conceptual 
definition of postmodernism capable of escaping the presuppositional logic of 
modern intellectual thought. The scepticism towards the idea of imposing ‘mod- 
ern’ standards upon ‘the postmodern’, when conceptualizing the latter from the 
viewpoint of the former, is reflected in statements such as the following: 
 
Already in such a reading, modern values of clarity, consensus and convergence 
are privileged over heterogeneous ways of thinking that accept and work with 
ambiguities, uncertainties and complexity. The very idea that the postmodern 
has to mean something, that this meaning is to be clear, and that any movement 
that is postmodern in orientation is to be necessarily one and unified in aim is 
already to work from modernist value presuppositions, and to promote these over 
any alternative perspective.108 
Post-modernists are loath to define […]. Definitions engage with those very 
qualities of rationality and objectivity that post-modernists are at pains to 
deny.109 
It is difficult to avoid giving a modern definition of the postmodern; in fact, 
virtually any definition of postmodernism will turn out to be modernist.110 
 
Furthermore, it is striking that various critical commentators insist that, owing 
to its eclectic intellectual roots and its diversified relevance to different areas of
 study, it may be pointless to try to define the term ‘postmodern’ in a clear and unam- 
biguous manner: 
 
[…] the label ‘postmodern’ is problematic, lumping together often conflicting 
theorists and practices.111 
Postmodernism is a contemporary movement. [… I]t is not altogether clear what 
the devil it is. In fact, clarity is not conspicuous amongst its marked attributes.112 
[…] the term postmodern […] lacks any conceptual prevision, or any empirical 
grip on so-called ‘reality’.113 
‘Postmodernism’ is a term that defies simple definition.114 
Postmodernity is The-Whatever-It-Is that succeeds that modernity.115 
[…] postmodernism […] has no fixed meaning […].116 
[…] postmodernism defies all simple definitions.117 
 
In addition to this definitional problem, it is worth mentioning that, although – 
for at least the last three decades – it has been common to make use of the term 
‘postmodernism’, it seems to be unpopular to be classified as a ‘postmodernist’, 
given that only very few theorists identify openly and explicitly with this label. 
 
It is a dangerous provocation to be a post-modernist, in academic circles at least. 
There are far more books and articles telling us what is wrong with post-modern 
theory than there are statements in its favour.118 
One of the curious features of the discussion which has developed around   
the controversial idea of postmodern social and philosophical thought is that 
the analysts most closely identified with the idea of the postmodern might be 
described as, at best, reluctant participants.119 
 
In short, as elucidated in the above passages, the concept of ‘the postmodern’ 
appears to be difficult – or, perhaps, impossible – to define in (a) non-modern and non- 
logocentric, (b) unambiguous and concise, and (c) outspokenly favourable and unequivo- 
cally sympathetic terms. Whatever one makes of these objections and reflections, 
all definitional and methodical attempts to make sense of ‘the postmodern’ are 
fraught with difficulties. Far from constituting a coherent ideological tradition or 
clearly definable school of thought, ‘postmodernism’ has been shaped by an eclectic and 
heterogeneous intellectual movement, whose supporters share one significant characteris- 
tic: namely, radical scepticism towards beliefs and principles associated with the project 
of modernity in general and with Enlightenment thought in particular. What advocates 
of ‘postmodernism’ also have in common, however, is that – paradoxically – they 
are intellectually and socially attached to the historical horizon from which they 
seek to detach themselves: the condition of modernity. It is not the existence of 
‘the postmodern’ that has given rise to the notion of ‘the modern’; rather, it is the 
existence of ‘the modern’ that precedes the rise of the idea of ‘the postmodern’.120 
 To be sure, there is no point in denying the considerable influence that post- 
modern thought has had, and continues to have, on key debates and controversies 
in the contemporary social sciences. It is nonetheless  important to acknowledge 
that both the referential relevance and the discursive force of postmodern 
approaches are largely due to their provocative – and, in many ways, intellectually 
enriching – opposition to modern traditions of thought, notably those inspired 
by, or representative of, the Enlightenment. As illustrated in the multifaceted his- 
tory of intellectual thought, a crucial indicator of the impact of hegemonic discourses 
on society is their capacity to trigger the emergence of counterhegemonic discourses.121 It 
is because of, not despite, the fact that postmodern thought has been immensely 
influential that it has been substantially criticized in numerous ways and by vari- 
ous scholars with diverse disciplinary backgrounds. Thus, the multifaceted forms 
of criticism levelled against postmodern thought should be regarded not only as 
a sign of its substantive weaknesses and limitations, but also as a manifestation of 
its considerable strengths and contributions. 
The definitional elasticity of the term ‘postmodern’ is symptomatic of both the 
theoretical complexity and the wide-ranging scope of the ‘postmodern turn’.122 In 
fact, one may contend that the postmodern insistence upon the empirical indeter- 
minacy of the contemporary world is reflected in the conceptual indeterminacy of 
postmodern thought. Given its commitment to theoretical eclecticism and its oppo- 
sition to the usage of ‘totalizing’ analytical straitjackets, it is difficult to offer a com- 
prehensive – let alone a universally applicable – definition of postmodern thought. 
Be that as it may, one of the key characteristics of postmodern approaches is to 
be suspicious of seemingly coherent, exhaustive, and reliable definitions aimed at 
offering adequate conceptual accounts of particular material or symbolic aspects 
of reality. Since supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ set themselves the task of 
escaping the ‘totalizing parameters’ imposed by Enlightenment thought, their 
provocative writings open up a discursive space for discussions on the social con- 
ditions and hermeneutic presuppositions underlying the production of meaning. 
Considering its subversive ways of destabilizing and deconstructing common- 
sense knowledge and taken-for-granted assumptions, it comes as no surprise that 
‘“[p]ostmodernism” was for a time a darling of the “Left”’123 and that various 
commentators insist upon direct or indirect links between postmodernism and criti- 
cal theory124 as well as – perhaps, less surprisingly – upon obvious or subtle con- 
nections between postmodernism and feminism;125 some critics are even inclined to 
argue that valuable insights may be gained from cross-fertilizing postmodernism 
and Marxism.126 Whatever the theoretical or practical benefits from creating para- 
digmatic alliances between postmodernism and other intellectual traditions may 
be, we still need to address one central question: Who are these ‘postmodernists’? 
The following section shall grapple with this issue. 
 
Who Are These ‘Postmodernists’? 
The list of scholars whose works are – directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly, 
rightly or wrongly – associated with the rise of postmodern thought is long. In 
alphabetical order, we may mention the following scholars who – in many cases,
 contrary to their will, or, in some cases, posthumously and, hence, without their 
knowledge – appear to have played a noticeable role in the construction and 
development of postmodern thought: 
 
Perry Anderson (1938–), Jean Baudrillard (1929–2007), Zygmunt Bauman 
(1925–), Steven Best (1955–), Judith Butler (1956–), Gilles Deleuze (1925–95), 
Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), Mike Featherstone (1946–), Michel Foucault 
(1926–1984),  Francis  Fukuyama  (1952–),  Félix  Guattari  (1930–92),  Donna  J. 
Haraway (1944–), Sandra Harding (1935–), Nancy Hartsock (1943–2015), David 
Harvey   (1935–),    Ihab  H.  Hassan  (1925–),    Martin  Heidegger   (1889–1976), 
Ágnes Heller (1929–), Linda Hutcheon (1947–), Andreas Huyssen (1942–),  
Luce Irigaray (1932–), Fredric Jameson (1934–), Keith Jenkins (1943–), Douglas 
Kellner (1943–), Ernesto Laclau (1935–2014), Scott Lash (1945–), Bruno Latour 
(1947–), David Lyon (1948–), Jean-François Lyotard (1924–98), Michel Maffesoli 
(1944–), Doreen Massey (1944–), Chantal Mouffe (1943–), Linda J. Nicholson 
(1947–), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Richard Rorty (1931–2007), Steven 
Seidman (1948–), Hugh J. Silverman (1945–), Edward Soja (1940–), Keith Tester 
(1960–), John Urry (1946–), Gianni Vattimo (1936–), Robert Venturi (1925–), 
Wolfgang Welsch (1946–), Ludwig Wittgenstein (i.e. the later Wittgenstein) 
(1889–1951), Iris Marion Young (1949–2006), and Slavoj Žižek (1949–). 
 
Of course, the above list is necessarily selective and, thus, not exhaustive. Since 
the present study aims to provide a thematically organized, rather than an author- 
focused, account of the key assumptions underlying the ‘postmodern turn’, there 
is not much point in giving a comprehensive overview of the main intellectual 
contributions made by the thinkers whose oeuvres are – rightly or wrongly – 
considered to have played a central, or at least a marginal, role in the creation of 
a postmodern tradition of thought. A wide range of useful introductions to their 
works can be found in the literature, allowing us to appreciate the relevance of 
their writings not only to the development of postmodern thought but also, more 
widely, to contemporary forms of social and political analysis. The question that 
poses itself in this context is to what extent the names of the critics and research- 
ers whose works are inextricably linked to the rise of postmodern thought can  be 
classified in a meaningful manner, in order to capture the intellectual scope and 
significance of their oeuvres. The following criteria appear to be particularly 
important in this regard. 
(1) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post-
modern turn’ in terms of their geographical origin: 
 
• African (e.g. Hassan); 
• Anglo-European (e.g. Anderson, Featherstone, Harvey, Jenkins, Lyon, Massey, 
Soja, Tester, Urry); 
• continental European (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, 
Guattari, Harvey, Heidegger, Heller, Huyssen, Irigaray, Latour, Lyotard, 
Maffesoli, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Vattimo, Welsch, Wittgenstein, Žižek); 
 • North American (e.g. Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, 
Hassan, Hutcheon, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman, 
Silverman, Soja, Venturi, Young); 
• South American (e.g. Laclau). 
 
Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of the most influential scholars associ- 
ated with postmodern thought are continental European or North American. 
(2) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of their national origin: 
 
• Argentinean (e.g. Laclau); 
• Austrian-British (e.g. Wittgenstein); 
• Belgian (e.g. Mouffe); 
• British (e.g. Anderson, Featherstone, Harvey, Jenkins, Lyon, Massey, Soja, Tester, 
Urry); 
• Canadian (e.g. Hutcheon); 
• French (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Irigaray, Latour, 
Lyotard, Maffesoli); 
• German (e.g. Heidegger, Huyssen, Nietzsche, Welsch); 
• Hungarian (e.g. Heller); 
• Italian (e.g. Maffesoli, Vattimo); 
• Polish  (e.g. Bauman); 
• Slovenian  (e.g. Žižek); 
• US-American (e.g. Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Hassan, 
Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Venturi, 
Young). 
 
What is striking in this respect is that the majority of those widely considered as 
‘founding figures’ or ‘reference figures’ of the postmodern project are French or 
US-American. 
(3) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of the linguistic specificity of their major writings, that is, on the 
basis of their main working language(s): 
 
• Anglophone (e.g. Anderson, Bauman, Best, Butler, Featherstone, Fukuyama, 
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan, Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen, 
Jameson, Jenkins, Kellner, Laclau, Lash, Lyon, Massey, Mouffe, Nicholson, Rorty, 
Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Venturi, Wittgenstein, Young, Žižek); 
• Francophone (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Irigaray, 
Latour, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Mouffe); 
• Germanophone (e.g. Heidegger, Huyssen, Nietzsche, Welsch, Wittgenstein); 
• Hispanophone (e.g. Laclau); 
• Italianophone (e.g. Vattimo). 
 
What is noticeable in this regard is that it is, by and large, Francophone  schol-     
ars whose writings are regarded as the path-breaking works of the postmodern
 tradition, whereas renowned Anglophone scholars appear to have taken on the role 
of recyclers and creative interpreters of this intellectual current. 
(4) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of their epochal situatedness. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish 
between early modern, modern, and late modern or – tautologically speaking – 
postmodern postmodernists: 
 
• scholars whose works were produced in the early modern period (approx. 
1600–1920), whose writings anticipated the rise of postmodern thought, but 
who did not necessarily have the intention of doing so, let alone of using the 
term ‘postmodern’ (e.g. Nietzsche); 
• scholars whose works began to have an impact on social thought in the modern 
period (approx. 1920–70) and whose writings appeared to indicate a conscious 
move into a new and unprecedented intellectual or historical horizon (e.g. 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein); 
• scholars whose main works emerged in a historical context that some would 
already characterize as late modern or postmodern (approx. 1970–present) and 
who aim to radicalize the historical condition associated with postmodernity 
(e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Bauman, Best, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Featherstone, 
Foucault, Fukuyama, Guattari, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan, 
Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray, Jameson, Jenkins, Kellner, Laclau, Lash, 
Latour, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Massey, Mouffe, Nicholson, Rorty, Seidman, 
Silverman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Young, Žižek). 
 
As illustrated above, some highly influential early modern and modern scholars are 
posthumously – and, hence, without their knowledge – associated with postmodern 
thought (notably Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the later Wittgenstein). Moreover, the 
key recent or contemporary figures whose ideas are – rightly or wrongly – brought 
into connection with postmodern thought have produced their major writings, 
roughly speaking, from 1970 onwards. 
(5) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post-
modern turn’ in terms of their generational belonging: 
 
• those born in the first part of the nineteenth century (1800–1850) (e.g. 
Nietzsche); 
• those born in the second part of the nineteenth century (1850–1900) (e.g. 
Heidegger, Wittgenstein); 
• those born in the 1920s (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Foucault, Hassan, 
Heller, Lyotard, Venturi); 
• those born in the 1930s (e.g. Anderson, Derrida, Guattari, Harding, Harvey, 
Irigaray, Jameson, Jenkins, Laclau, Rorty); 
• those born in the 1940s (e.g. Featherstone, Haraway, Hartsock, Hutcheon, 
Huyssen, Jenkins, Kellner, Lash, Latour, Lyon, Maffesoli, Massey, Mouffe, 
Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Urry, Welsch, Young, Žižek); 
• those born in the 1950s (e.g. Butler, Fukuyama); 
• those born in the 1960s (e.g. Tester). 
 As demonstrated above, most of the intellectual figures whose works are not 
only linked to postmodern thought but, in addition, likely to remain influential   
in decades, and possibly centuries, to come were born either in the nineteenth cen- 
tury (e.g. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein) or in the 1920s or early 1930s (e.g. 
Baudrillard, Bauman, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Rorty). Of course, this is partly 
due to the fact that it can take decades until a scholar – insofar as he or she suc- 
ceeds in making a groundbreaking contribution to his or her field of expertise and 
happens to be widely recognized for this achievement – is commonly regarded as 
a ‘big name’. More importantly, however, this illustrates that the late twentieth- 
century ‘big names’ related to postmodern thought experienced their intellectual 
upbringing in the post-War era and produced their principal writings in the period 
leading to the end of the Cold War, which – in the context of the collapse of state 
socialism – has led to the increasing delegitimization of ideological grand narra- 
tives inspired by Marxism. 
(6) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post- 
modern turn’ in terms of the context-specific impact of their main works, that is, in 
terms of the period in which they were particularly prolific and began to have a 
substantial influence on Western intellectual thought: 
 
• in the late nineteenth century (e.g. Nietzsche); 
• in the 1930s (e.g. Heidegger, Wittgenstein); 
• in the 1960s (e.g. Venturi); 
• in the 1970s (e.g. Baudrillard, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Heller); 
• in the 1980s (e.g. Bauman, Featherstone, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, 
Hassan, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray, Jameson, Laclau, Lash, Latour, Lyotard, 
Massey, Mouffe, Rorty, Urry, Vattimo, Welsch); 
• in the 1990s (e.g. Anderson, Best, Butler, Fukuyama, Jenkins, Kellner, Lyon, 
Maffesoli, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, Tester, Young, Žižek); 
• in the first decade of the new millennium (see 1990s). 
 
What is remarkable in this respect is that the most influential twentieth-century fig- 
ures associated with postmodern thought published their masterpieces in the late 1970s 
and 1980s. In other words, most of them – and this applies particularly to French 
representatives of postmodern forms of analysis – produced their key writings in 
the aftermath of 1968, which had led to a radical restructuring of both established 
institutional arrangements and hegemonic ideological discourses in the West. 
(7) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘post- 
modern turn’ in terms of their discursive positioning. (a) Posthumous and unwitting 
participants are those scholars whose works began to be linked to postmodern 
thought long after their death. (b) Reluctant and non-proselytizing participants are 
those thinkers who do not explicitly identify with the label ‘postmodern’, or – in 
some cases – even reject it, but whose works are nevertheless associated with this 
term. (c) Moderate sympathizers are those theorists who, while they do not neces- 
sarily proclaim the advent of postmodernity or of the ‘postmodern turn’, endorse 
the postmodern project, no matter how vaguely defined. (d) Enthusiastic supporters
 and contributors are those who explicitly advocate, and actively participate in, the 
creation of a postmodern paradigm and the construction of a postmodern society. 
According to this categorization, it is possible to classify the scholars whose works 
are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ as follows: 
 
• posthumous and unwitting participants (e.g. Heidegger, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein); 
• reluctant and non-proselytizing participants (e.g. Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, 
Fukuyama, Guattari, Harvey, Heller, Irigaray, Jameson, Laclau, Latour, Massey, 
Mouffe, Rorty, Urry, Young); 
• moderate sympathizers (e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Bauman, Best, Haraway, 
Harding, Hartsock, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Maffesoli, Tester, 
Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Žižek); 
• enthusiastic supporters and contributors (e.g. Featherstone, Hassan, Lyotard, 
Jenkins, Lyotard, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja). 
 
What is noticeable when considering the above classification is the following: 
although there are only a handful of posthumous and unwitting participants,  given 
that they are widely regarded as ‘classical figures’ of Western intellectual thought, 
their works are of canonical significance to the postmodern project. Furthermore, the 
vast majority of thinkers whose writings are linked to the ‘postmodern turn’ can be 
described either as reluctant and non-proselytizing participants or as moderate sympathiz- 
ers. Ironically, then, the principal intellectual figures whose names are associated with 
postmodern thought do not unambiguously identify with this label. Critics may legit- 
imately argue that, in this light, the ‘postmodern turn’ is a project that lacks explicit, 
strong, and widespread support among those who are considered to be key repre- 
sentatives of its intellectual spirit. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that self-declared, 
open, and whole-hearted supporters of the ‘postmodern turn’ represent a clear minority. 
(8) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of their oppositional attitude(s): 
 
• the critique of anthropocentrism (e.g. Best, Foucault, Latour, Lyotard); 
• the critique of binaries (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway, Hartsock, Irigaray, 
Latour, Nicholson, Rorty, Young); 
• the critique of (and a certain fascination with) consumer capitalism (e.g. Best, 
Featherstone, Harvey, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Tester, Urry); 
• the critique of disciplinary power and surveillance (e.g. Foucault, Lyon); 
• the critique of essentialism (e.g. Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, 
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Irigaray, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman, Young); 
• the critique of foundationalism (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Latour, Nietzsche, Rorty, 
Seidman, Silverman, Young, Žižek); 
• the critique of heteronormativity (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway, Harding, 
Hartsock, Irigaray, Nicholson, Seidman, Young); 
• the critique of logocentrism and representationalism (e.g. Derrida, later 
Wittgenstein); 
• the critique of metanarratives (e.g. Lyotard, Seidman); 
 • the critique of metaphysics (e.g. Heidegger); 
• the critique of modern reason (e.g. Foucault, Guattari, Heidegger, Lyotard, 
Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman); 
• the critique of modernity (e.g. Bauman, Foucault, Hassan, Heidegger, Hutcheon, 
Huyssen, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Seidman, Tester, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Žižek); 
• the critique of orthodox Marxism (e.g. Anderson, Deleuze, Foucault, Fukuyama, 
Guattari, Harvey, Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Lash, Lyotard, Massey, Mouffe); 
• the critique of traditional notions of sociality (e.g. Maffesoli, Seidman); 
• the critique of teleologism (e.g. Foucault, Fukuyama, Jenkins, Laclau, Lyotard, 
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman, Silverman, Welsch); 
• the critique of the instrumental organization of space (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja, 
Venturi). 
• the critique of the political economy of the sign (e.g. Baudrillard); 
• the critique of the subject (e.g. Foucault, Heidegger, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard, 
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Žižek). 
 
As illustrated in the above list, the cultivation of an eclectically minded ‘opposi- 
tional attitude’ is crucial to the ‘postmodern spirit’. In this sense, the postmodern 
endeavour is an attempt to break away from the canonical presuppositions of 
Enlightenment thought. While the opposition to orthodox Marxism is vital to the 
‘postmodern spirit’, it is striking that most Francophone thinkers whose writings are 
brought into connection with the postmodern project come – both politically and 
intellectually – from a Marxist tradition and are, as a result, often described as ‘post- 
Marxists’. Of course, as demonstrated above, the subversive nature of postmodern 
thought has many facets. Its opposition to the grand narrative of ‘scientific social- 
ism’, however, is particularly important for the following reason: it indicates that the 
crisis of Marxism and the rise of postmodernism, in the early 1990s, historically coincide. 
(9) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of their thematic contributions: 
• postmodern epistemologies (e.g. Best, Derrida, Foucault, Haraway, Harding, 
Hartsock, Hassan, Heidegger, Irigaray, Kellner, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard, 
Nicholson, Nietzsche, Rorty, Seidman, Silverman, Urry, Vattimo, Welsch, later 
Wittgenstein, Young, Žižek); 
• postmodern methodologies (e.g. Foucault, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock); 
• postmodern sociologies (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Featherstone, Foucault, 
Haraway, Hartsock, Harvey, Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Lyotard, 
Maffesoli, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Soja, Tester, Urry, Vattimo); 
• postmodern historiographies (e.g. Foucault, Fukuyama, Heidegger, Heller, 
Jenkins, Lyotard, Nietzsche, Vattimo, Žižek); 
• postmodern politics (e.g. Fukuyama, Haraway, Hartsock, Harvey, Heller, Irigaray, 
Kellner, Laclau, Mouffe, Nicholson, Seidman, Soja, Young). 
More specifically: 
 
• postmodern theories of actor–network relations (e.g. Latour); 
 • postmodern theories of deconstruction (e.g. Derrida, Heidegger); 
• postmodern theories of desire (e.g. Deleuze, Guattari); 
• postmodern theories of gendered performance (e.g. Butler, Foucault, Haraway, 
Hartsock, Irigaray, Nicholson); 
• postmodern theories of hyperreality (e.g. Baudrillard, Lash); 
• postmodern theories of literature (e.g. Hutcheon, Huyssen). 
• postmodern theories of parody (e.g. Hutcheon); 
• postmodern theories of power (e.g. Butler, Haraway, Hartsock, Laclau, Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Lyon, Mouffe, Nietzsche, Seidman); 
• postmodern theories of space (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja, Venturi); 
• postmodern theories of the economy (e.g. Anderson); 
• postmodern theories of the media (e.g. Tester); 
• postmodern theories of the self (e.g. Bauman, Deleuze, Foucault, Guattari, 
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Irigaray, Maffesoli, Seidman, Tester). 
 
The above list illustrates that the thematic areas covered by postmodern thought are 
impressively wide-ranging. In fact, the ‘postmodern turn’ has shaped – albeit to different 
degrees and with different results – key debates and controversies in almost every single 
discipline in the social sciences and, arguably, also in the humanities. Moreover, it is 
ironic that, despite their anti-foundationalist spirit, all postmodern approaches – in 
any academic discipline and in any thematic area – share a foundational motiva- 
tion: namely, the epistemologically inspired relativization of cognitive, normative, 
and aesthetic standards. Put differently, epistemic relativism constitutes the paradig- 
matic cornerstone of postmodern approaches in the social sciences. 
(10) Somewhat more contentiously, one can classify the scholars whose works 
are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ in terms of their philosophical or ideologi- 
cal positioning: 
in terms of classical big-picture ideologies: 
 
• anarchist (e.g. Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault); 
• conservative (e.g. Fukuyama, Heidegger); 
• fascist or quasi-fascist (e.g. Heidegger); 
• liberal (e.g. Fukuyama, Hassan, Rorty); 
• Marxist or post-Marxist (e.g. Anderson, Baudrillard, Derrida, Foucault, Harvey, 
Heller, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Massey, Mouffe, Vattimo, Žižek); 
• social-democratic/Weberian (e.g. Bauman, Lash, Tester); 
 
in terms of issue- or paradigm-specific ideologies: 
• animal rights (e.g. Best); 
• cosmopolitan (e.g. Derrida); 
• differentialist (e.g. Butler, Featherstone, Harding, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, 
Vattimo, Young); 
• feminist (e.g. Butler, Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Hutcheon, Irigaray, 
Nicholson, Young); 
• Freudian (e.g. Deleuze, Guattari); 
 in terms of anti-ideological ideologies: 
 
• cynical ironist (e.g. Hutcheon, Latour, Rorty); 
• nihilist (e.g. Nietzsche); 
• relativist (e.g. Huyssen, Jenkins, Lash, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Urry, Venturi, 
Welsch, later Wittgenstein). 
 
One curious paradox of various postmodern approaches in the social sciences – 
and, arguably, in the humanities – is their post-Marxist anti-Marxism: heavily 
influenced by Marxist thought, they question the validity of its key ideological 
assumptions, thereby aiming to move away from this intellectual tradition. More 
importantly, however, we are confronted with another paradox when reflecting  
upon the philosophical or ideological underpinnings of postmodern thought: 
although the rise of postmodern approaches tends to be associated with  the  
historical consolidation of a ‘postideological age’, an epoch in which classical big-
picture ideologies appear to have lost  legitimacy,  most  thinkers  associated  with the 
postmodern project have not only developed their approaches  within,  rather than 
outside, particular ideological frameworks,  but  also  continue  to  endorse specific 
worldviews. Thus, the ‘postmodern spirit’ is permeated by a form   of pseudo-post-
ideological anti-ideologism: it is thoroughly ideological, rather than postideological, not  
only  because  even  an  intellectual  paradigm  that  claims  to  be opposed to 
ideological thinking remains – by  definition  –  ideological,127  and  not only because 
postmodern thinkers emerged out of ideologically shaped intellectual traditions, but also 
because – similar to other ideologies and intellectual ‘-isms’ – postmodernism can, and has 
been, cross-fertilized with other ideological frameworks. Its ideological elasticity is reflected in 
the various  attempts  at  marrying  postmodernism with other ‘-isms’: postmodern 
anarchism; postmodern Marxism; postmodern social democracy; postmodern 
Weberianism; postmodern liberalism; postmodern conservatism; postmodern fascism; 
postmodern feminism; postmodern Freudianism; postmodern moralism; postmodern 
cosmopolitanism; postmodern globalism; post- modern cynicism; and postmodern 
nihilism. In short, postmodern thought is as adaptable as a living chameleon. 
(11) One can classify the scholars whose works are associated with the ‘postmod- 
ern turn’ in terms of their disciplinary background(s) or disciplinary speciality(ies): 
 
• philosophy (e.g. Best, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Guattari, Haraway, 
Harding, Hartsock, Heidegger, Heller, Irigaray, Kellner, Laclau, Latour, Lyotard, 
Mouffe, Nietzsche, Rorty, Silverman, Welsch, later Wittgenstein, Žižek); 
• sociology (e.g. Baudrillard, Bauman, Featherstone, Irigaray, Jameson, Kellner, 
Lash, Latour, Lyon, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Tester, 
Urry, Vattimo); 
• historiography (e.g. Anderson, Foucault, Jenkins, Nicholson); 
• politics and political theory (e.g. Anderson, Fukuyama, Foucault, Guattari, 
Haraway, Harding, Hartsock, Jameson, Kellner, Laclau, Mouffe, Nicholson, 
Young, Žižek); 
 • economics (e.g. Fukuyama, Jameson); 
• geography  (e.g. Harvey, Massey, Soja); 
• anthropology (e.g. Harvey, Latour); 
• architecture (e.g. Venturi); 
• literary theory (e.g. Butler, Derrida, Hassan, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Jameson, 
Lyotard); 
• cultural studies (e.g. Featherstone, Irigaray, Jameson, Lash, Latour, Žižek). 
 
Most of the ‘founding figures’ of the postmodern project are French social 
philosophers. More specifically, they tend to be regarded as scholars who are 
philosophically trained, sociologically oriented, politically motivated, culturally 
sophisticated, and rhetorically refined. It comes as no surprise, then, that the 
disciplinary relevance of postmodern thought is concentrated in the areas of phi- 
losophy, sociology, political science, cultural studies, and literary theory.  
(12) More controversially, one can classify – and, indeed, rank – the scholars 
whose works are associated with the ‘postmodern turn’ in terms of their intellec- 
tual influence: 
 
• highly influential (established ‘classics’, ‘paradigm inventors’, and ‘game chang- 
ers’) (e.g. Foucault, Heidegger, Nietzsche, later Wittgenstein); 
• very influential (very prominent contemporary scholars) (e.g. Anderson, 
Baudrillard, Bauman, Butler, Deleuze, Derrida, Fukuyama, Guattari, Jameson, 
Laclau, Latour, Lyotard, Maffesoli, Mouffe, Rorty, Žižek); 
• influential (prominent contemporary scholars) (e.g. Best, Featherstone, Haraway, 
Harding, Hartsock, Harvey, Hassan, Heller, Hutcheon, Huyssen, Irigaray, 
Jenkins, Kellner, Lash, Lyon, Massey, Nicholson, Seidman, Silverman, Soja, 
Tester, Urry, Vattimo, Venturi, Welsch, Young). 
 
Surely, league tables aimed at capturing the impact of particular scholars in 
academic fields and subfields are not only contentious and relatively arbitrary, 
but also potentially dangerous and counterproductive. If we are willing to accept, 
however, that – for the right or the wrong reasons – some intellectual figures   
are, overall, more influential than others, then we are confronted with a striking 
phenomenon when examining the wider significance of scholars whose works are 
associated with postmodern thought: only some of them may be characterized as 
‘pioneering’ early modern or modern thinkers; quite a few of them may be conceived 
of as ‘pioneering’ late modern or postmodern thinkers; yet, a noticeably large propor- 
tion of postmodern advocates and sympathizers can be classified as influential 
‘commentators’ and ‘recyclers’, rather than as ‘paradigm inventors’, within contem- 
porary intellectual disputes. 
 
The Intellectual Scope and Influence of Postmodern Thought 
The variety of academic and non-academic approaches to ‘the postmodern’ is 
overwhelming. One may go as far as to suggest that, over the past three decades, 
the ‘postmodern spirit’ has succeeded in colonizing almost every discipline and
 every research area in the social sciences, especially in circles of debate and con- 
troversy dominated by Anglophone scholars: ‘the spectre of postmodernism spread 
its wings over almost every subject imaginable […]: postmodern finance, postmodern 
housing policy, postmodern algebra, the postmodern library, the postmodern 
brain and the postmodern Bible’.128 We may now speak of a ‘postmodern Marx, 
or Durkheim, or Simmel, or Parsons, or feminism’.129 
Given this wide-ranging impact, most studies of postmodern thought empha- 
size the conceptual elasticity, discursive multiplicity, and interdisciplinary applicability 
that characterize their object of enquiry. The key question that remains in this 
respect, then, is whether or not the engagement with postmodern thought can 
still be regarded as a worthwhile investigative endeavour in the early twenty-first 
century. When examining the sociogenesis of postmodernism, it appears that the in- 
depth interest in postmodern thought within the social sciences and humanities 
reached its peak in the mid-1990s: 
 
[…] the flow of publications with postmodern/postmodernism/postmodernity 
in their title increased from a tiny stream in the 1970s to a huge flood in the 
1990s. It expanded from a total counted number of 37 publications  in the 
1970s to 534 in the 1980s and 4219 in the 1990s.130 
 
One may speculate about the reasons why, ‘[f]rom the early 1980s into the 
1990s, debates over the modern and the postmodern were the hottest theoretical 
game in town’,131 and why, furthermore, postmodernism reached its most influential 
point in time in the mid-1990s. Undoubtedly, ‘the intellectual crisis of Western 
Marxism’,132 shortly before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, played a 
pivotal role, as postmodernism appeared to fill an ideological and political ‘power 
vacuum caused by the collapse of Marxism’.133 In the context of an increasingly glo- 
balized world, in which, for many observers and commentators, viable alternatives 
to the hegemony of liberal-capitalist systems had lost all credibility and legitimacy, 
postmodernism was perceived, by many, as an attractive – and, allegedly, postideo- 
logical – paradigm able to account for the chaotic and disorganized constitution of 
an epoch in which teleological conceptions of history served, at best, as simplistic 
templates for the reductive interpretation of fundamentally directionless and 
unpredictable societies. The end of the Cold War – triggered by the collapse of 
state-socialist regimes in large parts of the world – appears to have led to the crea- 
tion of a postmodern jungle whose inhabitants are, consciously or unconsciously, 
motivated by the slogan ‘anything goes’.134 The ‘anything-goes-world’135 is a uni- 
verse of limitless social, cultural, and political diversity in which there is no room 
for big-picture ideologies. Hence, announcements regarding the beginning of the 
era of postmodernity are intimately interrelated with provocative proclamations 
about ‘the end of ideology’.136 
Just as one may hypothesize as to why the engagement with postmodern 
thought peaked in the mid-1990s, one may  wonder  why  ‘around  1997  or  so 
the tide started to turn’.137 In this respect, one may favour one of the following 
explanations: 
 1. The social world is no longer ‘amenable to analysis as postmodern’.138 
According to this contention, the idea of ‘the postmodern’139 is now an 
anachronism. 
2. Debates and controversies concerning postmodern forms of being may be 
regarded as outdated because ‘we are all postmodernists nowadays’.140 On this 
account, given that postmodernity has, by this point, become an omnipresent 
reality and ‘our, more or less, universal condition’,141 the idea of ‘the post- 
modern’142 has, in relation to most aspects of society, converted itself into a 
tautology. 
3. The obsession with postmodernism ‘was a publishing phenomenon and the 
academic publishers pulled the plug on titles with the word because the profit 
margin could not be guaranteed’143 and because every form of paradigm- 
surfing, whether intellectually or commercially driven, has to come to an end. 
From this perspective, since ‘[b]oredom was bound to come [and…w]e get tired 
of buzzwords’,144 the idea of ‘the postmodern’145 is tantamount to little more 
than an obsolete commodity. 
 
In short, although the term ‘postmodern’ appears to have survived and is still 
being used in the current literature, it is now essentially ‘superseded’146 and has 
become somewhat of an outmoded catchword in the contemporary context. 
Thus, on the face of it, ‘[t]he postmodern – at least in the social sciences –      
has somehow disappeared from the view’.147 Even if, however, one is willing to 
concede that, while ‘[p]ostmodernism in the social sciences expanded strongly   
in the first half of the 1990s, but experienced a relative decline from 1995 to 
2000’,148 and even if one comes to the conclusion that ‘the period of its greatest 
influence is now over’,149 its continuing presence in recent and current academic 
and non-academic discourses illustrates that its lasting impact upon cutting-edge 
controversies – particularly in the areas of epistemology, methodology, sociology, 
historiography, and politics – is undeniable. Indeed, as numerous recently pub- 
lished investigations illustrate, postmodern thought continues to be relevant to a large 
variety of epistemological,150 methodological,151 sociological,152 historical,153 and politi- 
cal154 studies in the contemporary social sciences. Therefore, the following chapters 
shall demonstrate that ‘the spectre of postmodernism’155 is still very much with 
us and that, rather than prematurely announcing a ‘post-postmodern post mortem 
to postmodernism’,156 we need to face up to the fact that recent paradigmatic 
developments in the social sciences cannot be understood without considering its 
overall impact upon present-day forms of critical analysis. 
Of course,  the  ‘postmodern turn’  is  not  the  first  paradigmatic  shift  that  has 
been announced in the social sciences. In fact, it appears to be a common feature 
of academic research to be constantly shaped and reshaped by the proclamation 
of intellectual changes and transitions, which tend to be conceived of as ‘path- 
breaking’ by those who endorse them. Not much may be gained from counting 
the amount of paradigmatic ‘turns’ that have been proclaimed in the social sci- 
ences over the past two centuries. It is nevertheless useful to mention at least 
some of them, in order to illustrate that the invention of intellectual traditions
 and presuppositional frameworks is a widespread characteristic of academic forms 
of knowledge production. 
Among the most influential paradigmatic ‘turns’ advocated in the social sciences 
since the Methodenstreit157 are the following: the ‘interpretive turn’,158 the ‘linguistic 
turn’,159 the  ‘relativist  turn’,160 the  ‘deconstructive  turn’,161 the  ‘contingent  turn’,162 
the ‘liquid turn’,163 the ‘cultural turn’,164 the ‘autonomous turn’,165 the ‘identitarian 
turn’, the ‘reflexive turn’,166 the ‘empirical turn’,167 the ‘spatial turn’,168 the ‘per- 
formative turn’,169 the ‘pragmatic turn’,170 the ‘existentialist turn’,171 the ‘vitalist 
turn’,172 the ‘affective turn’,173 the ‘postsecular turn’,174 and – more recently – the 
‘digital turn’.175 As should become clear from the analysis developed in the remain- 
der of this study, one of the noteworthy features of the ‘postmodern turn’ is that  
it is intimately linked to at least five of the above-mentioned paradigmatic shifts. 
 
Key Dimensions of Postmodernity 
Considering the intellectual controversies sparked by the rise of modernity, it      
is not difficult to imagine that even those who endorse the view that, over the 
past few decades, we have been witnessing the arrival of the postmodern condi- 
tion have not been able to reach a consensus regarding the defining features of 
the contemporary age. Furthermore, to the extent that most commentators who 
defend the idea of ‘the rise of the postmodern age’ stress the chaotic and disorgan- 
ized constitution of this allegedly unprecedented historical period, it appears even 
less viable to grasp the arbitrarily and irregularly arranged elements of the current 
epoch in a systematic fashion. Nonetheless, following the thematic structure of 
the preceding enquiry concerning the nature of modernity, it makes sense to 
point out that six levels of analysis are especially important to exploring the prin- 
cipal characteristics of postmodernity.176 
(1) On the economic level, the rise of postmodernity is associated with deindustri- 
alization. The emergence and unstoppable development of postindustrial capital- 
ism can be considered as one of the central driving forces of the postmodern age. In 
the context of postindustrialism, it is not the case that the ‘primary sector’ and the 
‘secondary sector’ have disappeared. In other words, the agricultural and industrial 
areas of production, distribution, and consumption have not ceased to exist. Owing 
to the rapid growth of the tertiary sector since the second part of the twentieth 
century, however, postindustrial modes of economic activity have become the pre- 
ponderant productive force in the contemporary world. In postmodern societies, 
informational, technological, and cultural goods are the main sources of economic 
production, distribution, and consumption as well as the crucial resources at stake 
in terms of economic expansion, competition, and development. 
(2) On the epistemic level, the rise of postmodernity cannot be divorced from 
the gradual derationalization of society in general and of people’s lifeworlds in par- 
ticular. To be sure, derationalization processes under postmodern parameters do 
not involve the weakening, let alone the disappearance, of science in terms of its 
influence upon both the macro-organizational and the micro-experiential realms 
of society. On the contrary, due to the pivotal role played by expert knowledge 
and high technology in the economic and cultural developments of postindustrial
 societies, it appears that, in the contemporary world, science is more influential 
than ever before. One key feature of postmodern historical formations, however, 
consists in the fact that, in terms of its epistemic validity, science is regarded as one 
‘language game’ among others. The postmodern condition, then, is a polycentri- 
cally constructed universe in which no particular type of meaning-laden horizon 
of reference points – irrespective of whether it is institutional or ephemeral –   
can claim to possess an epistemic monopoly on  the  interpretation  of  reality. The 
derationalized world of postmodernity is shot through with competing dis- 
courses: economic, political, ideological, cultural, philosophical, artistic, religious, 
or scientific – to mention only a few.  Each of these discourses is based on a set   
of interconnected – yet, both irreducible and incommensurable – assumptions, 
whose acceptability is contingent not upon the constraining parameters of logical 
or evidence-based rationality, but upon context-specific criteria of validity emerg- 
ing out of relationally assembled constellations that are sustained by relatively 
arbitrary codes of social legitimacy. 
(3) On the political level, the rise of postmodernity manifests itself in processes 
of deideologization. Some would go as far as to assert that, because we have been 
witnessing the decline of traditional political ideologies, we now effectively live in 
a postideological age.177 To be clear, this is not to posit that individual and collective 
actors have ceased to generate ideas or to mobilize more or less coherent sets of 
background assumptions when attributing meaning to, and interacting with, the 
world. Rather, this is to acknowledge that, in the context of postmodernity, big- 
picture ideologies – such as anarchism, communism, socialism, liberalism, con- 
servatism, and fascism – have lost the considerable influence they once had. The 
delegitimization process of classical political ideologies is reflected – perhaps most 
notably – in the historical events leading to the end of the Cold War: the deep 
historical contingency and political questionability of all meta-ideological forma- 
tions is epitomized in the collapse of state socialism in Eastern and Central Europe 
at the end of the twentieth century. As a result of these major historical events, it 
appears that, effectively, capitalism is ‘the only game in town’178 and that, para- 
doxically, if there is any victorious worldview in the ‘postideological age’, it is a  
political liberalism absolved from having to compete with its most challenging 
historical rivals, namely socialism and communism. To put it bluntly, while the 
modern period was the age of ideologies, the postmodern era is an epoch seeking 
to move beyond ideologies. 
(4) On the organizational level, the rise of postmodernity is expressed in the ten- 
dency towards debureaucratization. This, of course, is not to maintain that bureau- 
cracies have disappeared in recent decades or that they will dissolve in the near 
future. On the contrary, bureaucratic forms of action coordination will continue 
to be crucial to the organization of highly differentiated societies, particularly with 
regard to their political, economic, and judicial spheres. What is striking, however, 
is that, at least since ‘the end of organized capitalism’179 has been announced, we 
have come to accept not only that the world is a less and less predictable place, 
but also that, in postmodern societies, large-scale bureaucracies are perceived as an 
obstacle to, rather than as a precondition for, the possibility of flexible, responsive,
 and efficient forms of action coordination. The condition of postmodernity is an 
extraordinarily dynamic social reality based on short-termism, risk-taking, and self- 
responsibility, rather than a project based on long-termism, cautious planning, and 
institutionally sustained solidarities. If the epitome of modernity is the idea of a 
totally administered society, postmodernity is about facing up to the prospects and 
opportunities, as well as to the limitations and risks, emerging within essentially 
uncontrollable realities. The ‘strong states’ of totally administered societies appear 
to have given way to ‘slim states’ assertive enough to protect, and adaptive enough 
to tolerate, the playfulness of postmodern realities. 
(5) On the cultural level, the rise of postmodernity emanates from, and mani- 
fests itself in, processes of hyper-individualization. To the extent that, according to 
Durkheimian parameters, the shift from premodern to modern society led to the 
transition from ‘mechanic’ to ‘organic’ solidarity, in a post-Durkheimian sense, the 
shift from modern to postmodern society is accompanied by the transition from 
‘organic’ to ‘liquid’ solidarity.180 Put differently, we have moved from the premod- 
ern ‘cult of God’ via the modern ‘cult of the unitary subject’ to the postmodern 
‘cult of the fragmented individual’. Postmodern actors continue to draw upon 
diverse sources of identity, enabling them to develop a sense of unique subjec- 
tivity: class, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, ‘race’, cultural preferences, life-
style, religion, age, ability, or political ideology – to mention but the most 
important ones. What distinguishes the construction processes of postmodern 
identities from hitherto existing modes of personhood formation, however, is 
their degree of adaptability, changeability, diversity, and complexity, that is, their 
polymorphous constitution derived from relationally defined forms of intersec- 
tionality. In consumerist societies, postmodern  individuals  are not only expected 
to pick and choose from different sources of personal and collective identity; in 
addition, they are required to exist as radically contingent, fluid, plural, contradic- 
tory, and knowledgeable selves:181 
 
A. As contingent selves, they constantly develop and adjust in relation to rapidly 
changing social, cultural, and historical contexts. 
B. As fluid selves, they are in a ceaseless state of flux, lacking an ultimate and 
context-transcending essence. 
C. As plural selves, they have a multiplicity of selves living within themselves and 
are, therefore, equipped with the capacity to take on a large variety of social 
roles, the number increasing with the complexity of the interactional contexts 
in question. 
D. As contradictory selves, they are internally divided by mutually challenging and 
conflicting selves and, hence, haunted by the experience of both circumstan- 
tial and existential dilemmas triggered by objectively existing, yet subjectively 
suffered, processes of psychosocial fragmentation. 
E. As knowledgeable selves, they are confronted with the challenging task of being 
able to mobilize both implicit and explicit, practical and theoretical, taken-for-
granted and discursive, intuitive and reflexive resources of action and 
cognition. 
 (6) On the philosophical level, the rise of postmodernity cannot be understood 
in separation from the task of deconstruction. In essence, the ‘deconstructive atti- 
tude’182 endorsed by postmodern philosophy is suspicious of the Enlightenment 
optimism vis-à-vis the assertive, regulative, and reflexive functions of modern science: 
 
A. The assertive function of modern science concerns its representational capacity 
to provide evidence-based – that is, epistemically adequate, analytically sound, 
and argumentatively convincing – accounts of the underlying mechanisms 
that govern both the constitution and the evolution of the natural world as 
well as of the social world. 
B. The regulative function of modern science designates its interventional capac- 
ity to offer purposive – that is, empirically viable, practically sustainable, and 
technologically ever more sophisticated – models permitting both individual 
and collective actors to gain increasing control over their physical and cultural 
environments. 
C. The reflexive function of modern science refers to its critical capacity to develop 
emancipatory – that is, conceptually insightful, intellectually enlightening, and 
socially empowering – knowledge equipping ordinary actors with the ability to 
make use of their rational faculties with the aim of liberating themselves from 
mechanisms of domination and, thus, from both the symbolic and the material 
chains of power-laden realities. 
 
By contrast, the age of postmodernity is characterized by radical incredulity towards the 
assertive, regulative, and reflexive functions of methodical enquiries and, consequently, by 
deep scepticism towards the representational, interventional, and critical capacities of sci- 
entific epistemologies. The invention of the modern subject capable of epistemically 
accurate representation, control-oriented intervention, and emancipatory reflection 
appears to have lost credibility in the context of postmodernity. For the postmod-  
ern universe is composed of a multiplicity  of human  and nonhuman  actors,  none 
of whom occupies an epistemically privileged position. All attempts to obtain the 
total and unequivocal mastery of a relationally constituted – and, hence, constantly 
shifting – reality end up reproducing the stifling logic of ethnocentric, logocentric,    
or anthropocentric claims to validity. From a deconstructivist point of view, then, a 
world without essences amounts to a planetary context of existence that does not 
allow for universal frameworks of representation, explanation, and  emancipation. 
For the spatiotemporal specificities of locally anchored realities are irreducible to epis- 
temic models oriented towards the discovery of context-transcending generalizability. 
 
Just as the foregoing overview of the main factors contributing to the rise of 
modernity is far from complete, the above outline regarding the principal aspects 
of the postmodern condition is not intended to be exhaustive. What such a 
synopsis illustrates, however, is that the contention that we have entered a 
‘postmodern era’ needs to be assessed in terms of its multifaceted presupposi- 
tional underpinnings. Thus, similar to the critical examination of the ‘condition 
of modernity’, we need to engage in a multifactorial analysis capable of grasping
 the various interrelated – and, to some extent, overlapping – dynamics that have, 
arguably, led to the emergence of postmodern societies. 
It is imperative to be aware of the fact that, paradoxically, the aforementioned 
elements can be considered as both reasons for and consequences of the rise of 
postmodernity: as contributing factors, the central function that they serve in the 
unfolding of historical developments has made the postmodern condition pos- 
sible; as tangible outcomes, they have been shaped by the historical settings that 
they have themselves brought into existence. In short, the dialectics of postmod- 
ernity stems from the interplay between several – principally (1) economic, (2) 
epistemic, (3) political, (4) organizational, (5) cultural, and (6) philosophical – fac- 
tors. These factors constitute, at the same time, the precondition for and the result of 
the emergence of novel – arguably postmodern – societal formations, which came 
into being in the Western world from the late twentieth century onwards and 
which, ever since their emergence, began to have an increasing influence upon 
civilizational developments across the globe. 
 
(Post-)Modernity, (Post-)Modernism, and (Post-)Modernization 
Offering preliminary short-hand definitions of the terms ‘modern’ and ‘postmod- 
ern’ involves the risk of giving a reductive account that distorts the complexity of 
the analytical task that lies ahead of us in the remainder of this book. In essence, 
this challenging – and, arguably, paradoxical – task consists in developing a system- 
atic account of the eclectic nature of both modern and postmodern thought. For the 
sake of conceptual clarity, it is useful to be aware of the following terminological 
differentiation: 
 
1. The term modernity shall be employed to refer to an epochal shift or break from 
traditional societies, implying the consolidation of an unprecedented social 
totality, with increasingly complex organizing principles, which began to 
develop in Europe from the late seventeenth century onwards and, gradually, 
spread around the globe. 
2. The term modernism shall be used to denote any discursive – notably, aesthetic, 
cultural, political, or academic – efforts to attach meaning to modernity and 
capture its historical specificity. 
3. The term modernization shall stand for any social and discursive processes that 
shape both the constitution and the awareness of the historical condition  
called ‘modernity’. 
 
In summary: (1) The term modernity designates the historical formation succeed- 
ing premodernity and preceding postmodernity. (2) The term modernism refers to 
the discursive practices reflecting the historical specificity of modernity. (3) The 
term modernization describes the relational processes – including the discursive 
practices – generating the historical phase of modernity.183 
Analogously, the following terminological differentiation is relevant to the 
argument developed in this book. 
 1. The term postmodernity shall be employed to refer to ‘an epochal shift or break 
from modernity involving the emergence of a new social totality with its own 
distinct organizing principles’.184 
2. The term postmodernism shall be used to denote any ‘aesthetic, cultural, politi- 
cal, or academic attempts to make sense of postmodernity’185 and capture its 
historical specificity. 
3. The term postmodernization shall stand for any social and discursive processes 
that shape both the constitution and the awareness of the historical condition 
called ‘postmodernity’. 
 
In summary: (1) The term postmodernity designates the historical phase succeed- 
ing modernity. (2) The term postmodernism refers to the discursive practices pre- 
vailing in postmodernity. (3) The term postmodernization describes the relational 
processes – including the discursive practices – creating the historical phase of 
postmodernity. 
The main argument of this study, which weaves the following chapters 
together, can be summarized as follows. The ‘postmodern turn’ in the social sci- 
ences reflects a paradigmatic shift from the Enlightenment belief in the relative 
determinacy of both the natural world and the social world to the – increasingly 
widespread – post-Enlightenment belief in the radical indeterminacy of all material 
and symbolic forms of existence. The far-reaching scope and considerable impact 
of this paradigmatic shift manifests itself in five presuppositional ‘turns’ that 
have substantially shaped the development of the social sciences over the past 
few decades: 
 
I.  the ‘relativist turn’ in epistemology; 
II.  the ‘interpretive turn’ in social research methodology; 
III. the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology; 
IV. the ‘contingent turn’ in historiography; and 
V. the ‘autonomous turn’ in politics. 
 
It shall be the task of subsequent chapters to shed light not only upon the theo- 
retical and practical complexity of these normative shifts, but also upon the wider 
impact they have had, and continue to have, upon the contemporary social 
sciences. 
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